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L INTRODUCTION
The so-called "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997,' '1 the fed-
eral government's latest venture into the abortion controversy, represents
its most arrogant, its most irresponsible, and its least thought-out foray
into this minefield. As many have observed, this bill-like the state stat-
utes which mirror it2 -bans a medical procedure described in terminol-
ogy that is virtually meaningless to the profession qualified to perform
abortions. Furthermore, the purpose and phraseology of these enacted or
proposed laws demonstrate both the lawmakers' lack of understanding of
Supreme Court precedent defming the abortion right and their consequent
confusion about the appropriate role of legislation in the practice of
medicine.
As subsequent reports have revealed, the highly-touted last-minute
support of the federal bill by the Board of Trustees of the American
Medical Association3 clearly does not express the opinion of large seg-
ments of its membership.4 The fact that AMA Executive Vice-President
1. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997).
2. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
3. See Nancy W. Dickey, M.D., A.M.A. Supports HiR. 1122 As Amended (updated May 20,
1997) <http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/releases/1997/hr521.htm> ("The American Medical Associa-
tion Board of Trustees has determined to support [H.R.] 1122 because it has now been significantly
changed to substantially meet the criteria which the Board established for any abortion legislation.");
see also Helen Dewar, AMA Backs 'Partial Birth' Abortion Curb; Endorsement of Legislation
Comes as Senate Vote Nears, WAsIL PosT, May 20, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Dewar, AMA Backs
Curb] (discussing the AMA's support for the bill and the specific changes to the bill that won their
support); David Espo, AMA Gives Support to Abortion Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 1997, at Al
(discussing changes that led to the AMA's support); Letter from P. John Seward, M.D., Executive
Vice President, American Medical Association, to the Hon. Rick Santorum, United States Senate
(May 19, 1997) (on file with the author) (informing Sen. Santorum of the AMA's changed position).
For an interesting opinion on the AMA's support for the bill, see Abigail Trafford, Editorial, The
Doctors Invite Congress In, WAsEL PosT, June 30, 1997, at A19. Trafford observes that, "[i]n effect,
the AMA said to Congress: You can come on in to the doctor's office and decide what kind of spe-
cific treatments the professional sons and daughters of Hippocrates can-and cannot-provide for
their patients." Ild.
4. See Della De Lafuente, AMA Delegates Back 'Partial-Birth' Ban, CH. SuN-TImEs, June 25,
1997, at 16 [hereinafter De Lafuente, AMA Delegates] (stating that some delegates continue to disa-
gree with the ban, although the association's official stance is one of support); Della De Lafuente,
AMA Members on Both Sides in Late-Term Abortion Debate, CHL SUN-Tnams, June 24, 1997, at 20
[hereinafter De Lafuente, AMA Members] (stating opinions of delegates who want the AMA to re-
cant its support for the bill); Jeremy Manier, AMA Delegates Object to Stand on Abortion Ban, C-.
Tam., June 24, 1997, at 2 (stating that delegates at the AMA's annual meeting were divided on the
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John Seward sent another letter to Congress outlining the organization's
Medicare agenda5 on the same day that he penned his support statement
further compromises the value of this lobbying group's official stance.
6
On the other hand, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, the professional group representing those whose medical decision
making authority and expertise are at stake here,7 has remained adamant
in its opposition to legislative prohibitions on "Intact Dilatation and Ex-
traction" ("Intact D&X"). ACOG cogently observes that "[t]he interven-
tion of legislative bodies into medical decision making is inappropriate,
ill advised, and dangerous." 8 ACOG's position has been reiterated in
issue of the organization's support of the ban and that some who did support the ban did so because
"'[w]e would prefer to have no legislation on this issue. .. [b]ut when Congress decides it wants
legislation, we want to be sure it addresses the procedure correctly' "); Robert Pear, A.M.A. Abortion
Stand Splits Its Members, N.Y. TmmS, May 22, 1997, at A16 (discussing the "rift in the organiza-
tion" caused by its support of the bill); Trafford, supra note 3 (noting that the AMA says it only
supported the bill because it was seen as the lesser of the possible evils; "[tio the AMA board...
the question was not how to preserve physician autonomy, but how to prevent the most restrictive
proposals from getting passed into law").
5. See Jonathan Gardner, Was AMA's Abortion Stand A Quid Pro Quo?, MoD. H.ATHC
May 26, 1997, at 3 (stating that the two letters were both sent by John Seward to Congress on the
same day); Judith Havemann, AMA Adversaries Question Tuning of Abortion Ban Stance, Legislative
Requests, WASH. Posr, May 30, 1997, at A7 (stating that "[t]he American Medical Association sent
Congress an eight-page list of legislative requests on the same day the powerful physicians organiza-
tion announced its crucial support for a Republican bill to restrict 'partial birth' abortions").
6. See Gardner, supra note 5 (suggesting that the "AMA's support for the legislation could
give the association more leverage in the upcoming battle over Medicare payments" but also stating
that both the AMA and the Republican party deny any such deal); Havemann, supra note 5 (discuss-
ing the possibility of a deal but also noting the denial on both sides); Albert R. Hunt, Politics and
People: Daschle Charts Common Ground on Abortion, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1997, at A15 (stating
that "there are credible reports the doctor's lobby secretly struck a deal with GOP leaders over
Medicare reimbursement in return for the endorsement"). For an interesting discussion, see Frank
Rich, Editorial, AMA's Switcheroo on Abortion Replays its '64 Sell-out on Tobacco, MILWAuKEE J.
S.NTunm., June 1, 1997, at 2, which compares this recent AMA move with its 1964 deal with the
tobacco lobby in which the AMA opposed health warnings on cigarette packages to insure tobacco-
state opposition to Medicare.
7. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists was founded in 1951 and has a
membership of 38,000 physicians specializing in fields pertaining to women's health and reproduc-
tion. See 1 ENCYCLOPED A OF AssOCIATIONS Part 2, 1510 (Christine Maurer & Tara E. Sheets eds.,
33d ed. 1998).
8. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Statement on Intact Dilatation and
Extraction 2 (Jan. 12, 1997) [hereinafter ACOG, Statement on Intact D&X] (on file with the author).
ACOG contends:
An intact D & X ... may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circum-
stance to save the life or preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in consultation
with the patient, based upon the woman's particular circumstances can make this decision.
The potential exists that legislation prohibiting specific medical practices, such as intact D &
X, may outlaw techniques that are critical to the lives and health of American women.
1998]
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statements issued by both the American Medical Women's Association9
and the American Nurses Association.
10
These organizations understand what Congress and state legislatures
which have acted similarly do not the law (whether derived by judges
under the Constitution or, enacted by legislatures) can set the parameters
of the sphere of acceptable physician/patient decision making-for exam-
ple, by defining the abortion right;1' by determining the status of physi-
cian-assisted suicide;12 or by establishing the norms of informed consent
that protect the patient from overreaching and help to ensure basic trust
and mutuality in the physician/patient relationship itself.13 The law over-
steps its bounds, however, when, having identified an appropriate health
care objective, it attempts for reasons other than patient health and wel-
fare to intrude into the physician/patient relationship by detailing the pre-
cise medical procedures that will be considered permissible or impermis-
sible for achieving the valid objective.
In any -given situation covered by the laws under consideration here,
it is to be assumed that the basic choice of the woman and her physician
to perform an abortion at all is a constitutionally protected choice under
the parameters established by the Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v.
Wade,14 as modified in 1992 by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.'5 This means either that the abortion, although
9. See 143 CONG. REc. S4708 (daily ed. May 20, 1997)) (Letter from Debra R. Judelson,
M.D., President, American Medical Women's Association, to Sen. Rick Santorum (May 20, 1997))
("AMWA does not endorse legislation which interferes with medical decisionmaking, particularly
when it fails to consider the health of the woman patient .... [We are gravely concerned that this
legislation does not protect a woman's physical and mental health, including future fertility, or con-
sider other pertinent issues such as fetal abnormalities.").
10. See id. (Letter from Geri Marullo, M.S.N., R.N., Executive Director, American Nurses As-
sociation, to Senator Barbara Boxer (May 20, 1997)) ("It is the view of the American Nurses Asso-
ciation that this proposal would involve an inappropriate intrusion of the federal government into a
therapeutic decision that should be left in the hands of a pregnant woman and her health care
provider.").
11. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
12. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800-127.995 (Supp.
1996); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271, 2275 (1997) (holding that there is no con-
stitutionally protected right to physician-assisted suicide, but noting that states may pass laws al-
lowing assisted suicide and encouraging public debate to continue on this issue); Vacco v. Quill, 117
S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997) (same).
13. See generally 1 BARRY R. FuRtow Er A., HF.-TH LAw §§ 6-9 to 6-19 (1995) (discussing
doctrine of informed consent as developed in both common law and statutes).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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late term, is pre-viability16 or that, even if the fetus is viable, abortion is
necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant woman.17 In the
latter instance, physicians may be required to take steps to preserve the
life of the post-viable fetus, but not at the expense of endangering the
woman's life or health.
18
At the center of the current controversy is a procedure for late term
abortions which, so far as anyone knows, is seldom practiced (albeit
more frequently than first claimed), and may indeed be regularly con-
ducted by only one physician in the country.19 Other doctors, however,
do utilize the technique from time to time;2° perform abortion procedures
16. See id. at 846 ("Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to
elect the procedure.").
17. See id. at 879 (reaffirming that " 'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its inter-
est in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother' ") (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
18. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485 n.8,
486 (1982) (upholding second physician requirement for post-viability abortions on grounds that law
contained an implied medical emergency exception); see also Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-71 (1986) (finding a provision of a Pennsylvania
law unconstitutional because it could result in a "trade-off" between the woman's health and fetal
survival since it only contained an exception if care for the fetus would result in a "significantly
greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman," and also finding a provision re-
quiring the attendance of a second physician in post-viability abortions unconstitutional because, un-
like the situation in Ashcroft, it did not contain an adequate medical emergency exception); Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1978) (striking down a provision of an earlier Pennsylvania law re-
quiring a physician to take steps to save the life of an aborted viable fetus because it was "uncertain
whether the statute permits the physician to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his
duty to the fetus, or whether it requires the physician to make a 'trade-off' between the woman's
health and additional percentage points of fetal survival"); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1503-
04 (10th Cir. 1995) (invalidating provision of Utah law that required physicians performing post-
viability abortions to use method that would have best possibility of saving life of fetus because ex-
ception was provided only when the method would cause "grave danger" to the woman and also
noting that "The importance of maternal health is a unifying thread that runs from Roe to Thorn-
burgh and then to Casey"), rev'd on other grounds, 518 U.S. 137 (1996).
19. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (noting that the actual number of D&X pro-
cedures performed is higher than first thought and that more doctors use the technique, or a variant,
than first reported, and in a broader variety of situations; nonetheless, the number is not high-likely
no more than a few thousand per year).
20. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(in a suit brought by Dr. Haskell and others, the trial court, after describing various abortion proce-
dures and reviewing several physicians' testimony in detail, specifically found that "[ait least three
doctors in Ohio perform some variation of the D & X procedure: Plaintiff Haskell; Dr. John Doe
Number One; and Dr. John Doe Number Two"), aft'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934) (citations omitted); see also Voinovich, 130
F.3d at 200 (noting testimony of the three doctors).
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that represent some variation of the basic technique;21 or may find the
technique useful at some future date.22 In their eyes, as well as in the
views of many of their colleagues, the issue involves not only women's
rights to choose a safe, legal abortion, but also their rights as physicians
to determine, in consultation with their patients, the best and most appro-
priate medical treatment for any given patient under her particular
circumstances. 3
This article will explore the movement to ban the targeted abortion
procedure and examine the evidence that emerges from the congressional
hearings and from other sources in an attempt to tease out the underlying
issues and subject the proffered arguments to analytical scrutiny. Are
these laws, as some claim, nothing more than part of the pro-life political
21. See Diane M. Gianelli, Abortion Rights Leader Urges End to 'Half Truths,' AM. MD.
NEws, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3 (stating that many doctors already do a variation on intact D&E); see also
infra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing data that emerged late in 1996 and early 1997 con-
cerning frequency of use of the procedure).
22. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070 (noting that "the D & X procedure appears to have
the potential of being a safer procedure than all other abortion procedures," implying that future de-
velopment and more widespread use of the technique might be both anticipated and desirable, if per-
mitted); accord Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 531 (D. Neb. 1997) (issuing temporary re-
straining order against Nebraska's ban, as applied to the practice of Dr. LeRoy Carhart); id. at 525-
27 (citing expert testimony in that case and others detailing the potential benefits of D & X over
conventional D & E).
23. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 248 (1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Warren M. Hem,
M.D., M.P.H., Ph.D., Dir. Boulder Abortion Clinic, Asst. Clinical Prof., Dept. of Obstetrics and Gyn-
ecology, Univ. of Colorado Health Sciences Center) ("I support the right of my medical colleagues
to use whatever methods they deem appropriate to protect the woman's safety during this difficult
procedure. It is simply not possible for others to second guess the surgeon's judgment in the operat-
ing room. That would be dangerous and unacceptable."); Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 64 (1995) [herein-
after House Hearing] (statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D., Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Gynecology
and Obstetrics, Johns Hopkins Univ.) ("The physician needs to be able to decide, in consultation
with the patient, and based on her specific physical and emotional needs, what is the appropriate
methodology. The practice of medicine by committee is neither good for patients or for medicine in
general."); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Statement on MR. 1833, The Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter ACOG, Statement on H.R. 1833]
(on file with the author) ("The College finds very disturbing any action by Congress that would su-
persede the medical judgment of trained physicians and that would criminalize medical procedures
that may be necessary to save the life of a woman."); National Abortion Federation, Later Abor-
tions: Questions and Answers 5 (1995) (on file with the author) ("Passing federal legislation against
a surgical procedure places Congress in an inappropriate position of deciding for women and for
doctors what is the best treatment for them to receive or give."); National Abortion and Reproduc-
tive Rights Action League, Late Term Abortion: The Myth of "Abortion on Demand" 2 (June 20,
1995) (on file with the author) ("When an abortion is needed, the physician's decision about which
procedure to use should be based on the health needs of the woman."); see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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agenda-an attempt to chip away at the abortion right itself?.24 Or are
they, as others assert, simply an effort to halt an unnecessarily cruel and
inhumane procedure under circumstances where alternatives for safe, ef-
fective abortions already exist?25 Are the restrictions constitutional-ei-
24. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 66 (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("I am con-
cerned as well that, although the focus of this legislation is, in fact, one particular type of abortion
used in late-term abortions, I fear that this is really an assault upon the basic right to have an abor-
tion."); id. at 61 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("This bill is a calculated effort to undermine Roe v.
Wade and to undercut subsequent Supreme Court decisions that have affirmed a woman's constitu-
tional right to choose to have an abortion."). Senator Kennedy stated:
The so-called Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is extremist legislation at its worst. It is the
latest tactic in the strategy of those who want to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade and outlaw all abortions....
The street war against a woman's right to choose now comes before Congress in the
form of this bill. Its proponents have boasted that if they prevail, they will move on to out-
law more and more abortions in the United States, procedure by procedure.
Id. at 13-14 (Statement of Sen. Kennedy). J. Courtland Robinson, M.D. testified:
So then I have to wonder what you are trying to ban with this legislation. It sounds as if you
are trying to leave any later abortions open to question, to create a right of action and, in
fact, a criminal violation, to force doctors to affirmatively prove that they have not somehow
violated such a law....
... Because the law is so vague and based on erroneous assumptions, it would leave
doctors wondering if they were open to prosecution or not each time they performed a late
abortion. That means that by banning this technique, you would in practice ban most later
abortions altogether by making them virtually unavailable. And that means that women will
probably die.
I. at 104-05 (Statement of J. Courtiand Robinson, M.D.); see also House Hearing, supra note 23, at
29-30 (testimony of Rep. Schroeder) ("We all know that what people are really trying to get at here
is the fundamental right of women to receive medical treatment that they and their doctors deter-
mined to be safest and best for them.... This is a beginning of chopping away at a right we have
spent much too long in trying to ascertain."); David J. Garrow, Editorial, A LOOK AT... The New
Politics of Abortion; When 'Compromise' Means Caving In, W+,.s Posr, June 1, 1997, at C3 [here-
inafter Garrow, Editorial] ("Santorum and other enemies of women's choice hope to create a slip-
pery slope in which a 'partial-birth' ban leads to prohibition of all second- and third-trimester abor-
tions."); Kim Painter, Fueling the Debate: Late Abortions Spark New Controversy; Congress
Rethinks Ban on 'Partial-Birth' Method, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 1997, at ID (" 'It's no secret that
the National Right to Life Committee believes all children should be protected,' says its legislative
director, Douglas Johnson. 'We think anything that can be done to start moving things back is
worthwhile.' "). Cf. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 142 (statement of Helen M. Alvare, Esquire.,
on behalf of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities) ("We
are willing to work incrementally to save as many lives as possible, disabled or able-bodied, a bit at
a time.").
25. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 116 (statement of Helen M. Alvare, Esq.)
("No reasonable person can disagree, once he or she has read a description or seen an accurate
drawing of the partial-birth abortion method: it is one-fifth abortion and four-fifths infanticide. It
kills a child when 80 percent of his or her body is already outside the womb."); id. at 112 (state-
ment of Nancy G. Romer, M.D.) ("In my research and in talking with physicians who perform late
term abortions I found nothing preferable and safer than what I currently do. In fact when reading
the description of the D&X procedure I found several things that made this procedure very unattrac-
19981
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ther before or after fetal viability? Even if they are, do they represent
sound social policy?
This article takes the position that much of the evidence offered to
date represents political bias as much as it does scientific fact; that at
least some of the restrictions are blatantly unconstitutional, while others
are highly questionable under Casey; and that they do not, in any event,
constitute sound social policy. Even if the contemplated restrictions could
be framed in a manner to comport with current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence defining the abortion right, it is the special province of medical
practitioners-not lawmakers-to determine the safest and most effective
means of performing medical procedures appropriate for their patients'
optimal health. This is true whether the medical treatment at issue hap-
pens to be a technique for performing safe, legal abortions or whether it
concerns any other form of appropriate medical care.
Granted, the medical profession is extensively regulated: every state
has licensure laws;26 and both state and federal regulations seek, inter
alia, to prevent fraud;27 to insure informed consent to experimentation in-
volving human subjects28 (or any human tissue);29 and to assure the
tive."); id. at 81 (statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.) ("Partial-birth abortion is not a standard of care
for anything. In fact, partial-birth abortion is a perversion of a well-known technique used by obste-
tricians to deliver breech babies when the intent is to deliver the child alive. However... this tech-
nique is rarely used in this country because of the well known associated risks of maternal hemor-
rhage and uterine rupture."); Helen Dewar, Abortion Compromise Rejected; Daschle Plan to Restrict
Late-Term Procedure Falls Short, WAsm POsT, May 16, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Dewar, Abortion
Compromise Rejected] ("It is 'barbaric... shockingly close to infanticide,' said Sen. Tm Hutchin-
son (R-Ark.) .. ") (omission in original); Dewar, AMA Backs Curb, supra note 3 (quoting then
Chair of the AMA's Board of Trustees, Nancy W. Dickey, as saying that the bill bans a procedure
that is "never the only appropriate procedure and has no history in peer reviewed medical literature
or in accepted medical practice development"); Laurie Goodstein, Catholic Cardinals Vow to Lobby
Congress to Overturn Clinton's Abortion Veto, WAsm PosT, Apr. 17, 1996, at A14 (" 'Partial birth
abortion is an even more intense, more moving pro-life issue than many others that have gone
before,' [Helen M.] Alvare said. 'Killing a baby that's mostly born is very physically and emotion-
ally gripping.' "); Nancy Romer et aL, Editorial, Partial-Birth Abortion Is Bad Medicine, WAUX ST.
J., Sept. 19, 1996, at A22 ("Contrary to what abortion activists would have us believe, partial-birth
abortion is never medically indicated to protect a woman's health or her fertility. In fact, the opposite
is true: The procedure can pose a significant and immediate threat to both the pregnant woman's
health and her fertility.") (emphasis added).
26. See 1 FURRow Er AL., supra note 13, § 3-1.
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to a-7 (1994) (reproductive technology reporting provi-
sions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-1 to a-7 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (Medicare/Medicaid anti-fraud and abuse
provisions); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-310 to -321 (Michie 1992) (Medicaid anti-fraud provisions).
28. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (1996) (Department of Health and Human Services Policy
for Protection of Human Research Subjects); VA. CoDE ANN. § 32.1-162.18 (Michie 1992).
29. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208-.210 (pertaining to research involving fetuses); Woman's
Right-To-Know Act, 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-151 (forbidding experimentation involving fetuses).
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safety and effectiveness of drugs and medical devices.3° These laws share
a common concern for the safe and effective practice of their craft by
health care professionals and for the health and welfare of the patients
they treat. Within the parameters of those concerns, it is up to physicians,
acting in good faith and in consultation with their patients, to use their
best professional judgment to determine how to treat each patient.
From a legal perspective, what constitutes "accepted medical proce-
dure" 31 has always rested upon the only source capable of defining such
a standard-namely, the medical profession itself. Thus, for example, any
medical malpractice lawsuit depends for its proof upon the expert testi-
mony of physicians as to what the reasonably skilled physician would
have dne under the circumstances. 32 With respect to the procedure under
consideration here, the medical debate has not been resolved. One can
find in the medical literature both staunch support 33 and horrified castiga-
30. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994).
31. See 1 FuRRow Er AL, supra note 13, § 6-2, at 359-62:
The liability of health care providers is governed by general negligence principles. Mal-
practice is usually defined as unskillful practice resulting in injury to the patient, a failure to
exercise the "required degree of care, skill and diligence" under the circumstances....
The standard of care by which the conduct of both general practitioners and specialists is
measured is treated as national by most state courts. A good statement is found in Hall v.
Hilbun [466 So. 2d 856, 872-73 (Miss. 1985)]:
The duty of care.. .takes two forms: (a) a duty to render a quality of care
consonant with the level of medical and practical knowledge the physician may
reasonably be expected to possess and the medical judgment he may be ex-
pected to exercise, and (b) a duty based upon the adept use of such medical fa-
cilities, services, equipment and options as are reasonably available.
The standard of care applied in a tort suit or hospital peer review process does not nor-
mally derive from an external authority such as a government standard. In the medical profes-
sion, as in other professions, standards develop in a complicated way through the interaction
of leaders of the profession, professional journals and meetings, and networks of colleagues.
Ia (footnotes omitted).
32. See id. § 6-2, at 365:
The standard or custbmary practice by those in the defendant doctor's specialty or area
of practice is normally established through the testimony of medical experts....
... Expert testimony is needed to establish both the standard of proper professional skill
or care and a failure by the defendant to onform .... The expert must however be able to
say that the defendant's failure breached a general medical practice; a simple statement that
the expert would have done differently may not be sufficient.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 248 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.); id.
at 149 (testimony of Dr. Mary Campbell) ("This is far and away the safest procedure after 24
weeks. Well, dilation and intact extraction is far and away the safest procedure in the third trimes-
ter .. "); id. at 144 (letter from Dru Elaine Carlson, M.D., Dir. Reproductive Genetics, Dept. of
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tion.34 If in fact this abortion technique turns out to be "bad medicine,"
however, well established and trustworthy procedures for its regulation
are already in place: peer review mechanisms; state medical board licen-
sure decisions; and the medical malpractice system itself.
On the other hand, the abortion procedure sought to be regulated
may in fact turn out to represent an advance over existing techniques,
helping-in those apparently rare situations where it might be em-
ployed-to insure better patient health and future fertility. If legislatures
foreclose a potential avenue of progress by freezing into stone, so to
speak, the current state of this medical art, they will have indeed done a
disservice to women often caught in tragic circumstances. Legislators
simply are not equipped to make that call.
I. THE PROCEDURE
A. What is a "Partial-Birth Abortion"?
House Bill 1122 defines a "partial-birth abortion" as "an abortion
in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a
living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery. 35 The
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA, to Rep. Schroeder); An-
gela Bonavoglia, Separating Fact From Fiction: The Latest Battle Over a Woman's Right to Termi-
nate a Pregnancy Has Generated a Lot of Heat but Very Little Light, Ms., May-June 1997, at 54, 59
(quoting David Grimes, M.D., Vice Chair of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Univ. of California,
San Francisco, as saying, "[t]here's been no question about the safety of the D & E or its variants
for 20 years"); Diane M. Gianelli, Shock-Tactic Ads Target Late-Term Abortion Procedure, AM. MaD.
NEws, July 5, 1993, at 3 ("But the classic D&E, in which the fetus is broken apart inside the womb,
carries the risk of perforation, tearing and hemorrhaging, [Dr. Haskell] said. So he turned to the
D&X, which he says is far less risky to the mother."); infra notes 377-78 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 112 (statement of Nancy G. Romer, M.D.)
("There is no medical evidence that this procedure is safer nor necessary to provide comprehensive
health care to women. As currently practiced, it does not meet medical standards set by ACOG nor
has it been adequately proven to be safe nor efficacious."); id. at 18 (statement of Brenda Pratt Sha-
fer) ("I have been a nurse for a long time, and I have seen a lot of death--people maimed in auto
accidents, gunshot wounds, you name it. I have seen surgical procedures of every sort. But in all my
professional years, I had never witnessed anything like this."); House Hearing, supra note 23, at 79
(statement of Mary Ellen Morton, R.N., neonatal specialist and flight nurse) ("I am greatly disturbed
that the same gestational age and weight, human babies that I nurture in the NICU, can suffer
unimaginable agony at the hands of an abortionists [sic] before they are put to death, during the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Procedure."); id. at 42 (statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.) ("In fact, when I de-
scribed the procedure of partial-birth abortion to physicians and lay persons who I knew to be pro-
choice, many of them were horrified to learn that such a procedure was even legal."); De Lafuente,
AMA Members, supra note 4, at 20 ("But most of the 64 delegates who testified before a packed
committee meeting supported the AMA's board in supporting a ban, describing the technique as 'ab-
horrent' and 'repugnant.' ").
35. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
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Senate amendment adds to the federal bill a further definition:
" 'vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus' means delib-
erately and intentionally delivers into the vagina a living fetus, or a sub-
stantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure the
physician knows will kill the fetus, and kills the fetus."' 36 The purpose of
this addition was to tighten the definition and specify the mens rea
thought appropriate by the drafters to a criminal statute of this kind.
37
Nineteen states have enacted legislation prohibiting the procedure.
38 Of
36. Id.
37. See 143 CONo. REc. S4671 (daily ed. May 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Santorum):
The first thing this bill does, as has been referred to, is to tighten up the language on
what we mean by partial-birth abortion....
We have tightened up the language with mens rea, to use the legal term. That directs the
mental state--as to what the doctor was doing when he was delivering the baby for the pur-
pose of a live birth and is not doing an abortion.
So we tightened that language up substantially to satisfy that. That kind of situation
would no longer be covered under the act.
I think to the extent that we have made that clear and that it is positive to the extent that
we have put in the requisite mens rea for a criminal statute, which arguably was somewhat
vague in the original bill, we have now done that.
Id.
38. Note that in nine states federal courts have stayed enforcement of the statutes on a tempo-
rary or permanent basis: Arizona (Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, No. CV. 97-385-
TUC-RMB, 1997 WL 679921, at *13 (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 1997) (permanent injunction)); Arkansas
(Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, No. LR-C-97-581 (E.D. Ark. July 31, 1997) (tempo-
rary restraining order)); Georgia (Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, No. l:97-CV-1786-JOF (N.D. Ga. July
24, 1997) (order restricting enforcement to post-viability procedures, trial still to be held)); Louisiana
(Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, No. 97-2211 (E.D. La. July 14, 1997) (preliminary injunction));
Michigan (Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1320 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (permanent injunction)); Ne-
braska (Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 531 (D. Neb. 1997) (preliminary injunction against
ban as applied to practice of one physician; the court, however, uses very broad language that sug-
gests it would uphold a facial challenge, if presented with one)); New Jersey (Planned Parenthood v.
Verniero, No. 97-6170 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1997) (temporary restraining order)); Ohio (Women's Med.
Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1092 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934) (permanent injunction));
and Rhode Island (Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Pine, No. 97-416L (D.R.I. July 11, 1997) (temporary
restraining order)). See The State "Partial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Enjoined in the Courts, REPROD.
Ris. UPDATE (ACLUIReprod. Freedom Project), Jan. 13, 1997, at 1-3. Two state courts have taken
similar action: Alaska (Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., v. Alaska, No. 3AN-97-06019 (Alaska
Super. Ct. July 30, 1997) (temporary restraining order)); and Montana (Intermountain Planned
Parenthood v. State, No. BDV 97-477 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Oct. 1, 1997) (preliminary injunction)). See
id.; see also David Garrow, Despite the 'Partial Birth' Furor, Abortion Foes are Losing in Court,
WAst. PosT., Jan. 18, 1998, at C1 [hereinafter, Garrow, Abortion Foes are Losing] (summarizing ac-
tions in the states). Garrow also reports that "In Alabama, the state attorney general has averted a
face-off by declaring that the statute does not pertain to pre-viability procedures, and in Illinois, a
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the nineteen laws passed, ten use definitions identical to the original fed-
eral bill, which lacks a clear scienter requirement;39 seven contain slight
variations in wording (including Nebraska and New Jersey, which are the
only states to attempt any scienter clarification);40 and two refer to "dila-
tion and extraction."' 41
courtroom challenge is pending." Id.
39. See Alabama Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, 1997 Ala. Acts 97-485; Act of July
31, 1997, ch. 15, 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 65; Act of April, 10, 1997, ch. 83, 1997 Ariz. Legis. Serv.
2113 (West); Act effective July 1, 1997 Ga. Laws 357; Act effective July 1, 1997, 1997 Ind. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 1185; Mica Cow. LAws ANN. §§ 333.17016(5)(c), 333.17516(5)(c) (West Supp. 1997);
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, ch. 350, 1997 Miss. Laws 1494; Act of April 19, 1997, ch. 314,
1997 Mont. Laws 365; Act of March 26, 1997 S.C. Acts 11, 3502; Act of June 13, 1997, ch. 414,
1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1274.
40. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, 1997 Ark. Acts 984 (reiterating the fed-
eral language but adding the qualifying phrase, "or as defined by the United States Supreme
Court"). Illinois' variation on the federal wording is "partially vaginally delivers a living human fe-
tus or infant before killing the fetus or infant and completing the delivery. The terms 'fetus' and 'in-
fant' are used interchangeably to refer to the biological offspring of human parents." Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, 1997 111. Legis. Serv. 90-560 (West). The statute provides for criminal penalties
against "[any person who knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion." Id. Nebraska uses a defini-
tion similar to the federal definition and also adds the following scienter requirement similar to the
Senate amendment to the federal bill:
partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and complet-
ing the delivery... mhe term partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before kill-
ing the unborn child means deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living
unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that
the person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the un-
born child.
Act of June 9, 1997, 1997 Neb. Laws 23. New Jersey specifies a "living human fetus," but is other-
wise virtually identical to the federal bill, including the language of the scienter requirement added
on the federal level by the Senate amendment. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, 1997
NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 262 (West). Rhode Island substitutes for the federal language, "partially
vaginally delivers a living human fetus before killing the infant," H.B. 6051, 1997-98 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (R.I. 1997). South Dakota similarly substitutes for federal language by using the phrase "par-
tially vaginally delivered before killing the infant." H.B. 1088, 72nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (S.D.
1997). Louisiana departs substantially from the federal wording by defining partial birth abortion as
the following:
mhe performance of a procedure on a female by a licensed physician or any other person
whereby a living fetus or infant is partially delivered or removed from the female's uterus by
vaginal means, and with specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm is then killed prior to
complete delivery or removal.
H.B. 128, 1997-98 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (La. 1997).
41. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
310.5 (Supp. 1996). Ohio, the first state to pass this type of legislation, specifically prohibits "dila-
tion and extraction," defined as "the termination of a human preguancy by purposely inserting a
suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain. 'Dilation and extraction procedure' does
not include either the suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of
abortion." Oino RLy. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A). Utah's statute uses both terms:
"[P]artial birth abortion" or "dilation and extraction procedure" means the termination
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Health care professionals are quick to point out that no such term as
"partial-birth abortion" exists in medical terminology or literature. 42
Rather, the method is variously referred to by its practitioners and other
health care professionals as "dilation and extraction," ("D&X");43 "in-
tact dilation and evacuation" ("intact D&E");" or "modified dilation
and evacuation" ("modified D&E").45 This method is generally reserved
for late term abortions, meaning those occurring at twenty weeks' gesta-
tion and beyond, when the skull of the fetus is too large to be removed
by the dilation and evacuation ("D&E") method commonly used for sec-
of pregnancy by partially vaginally delivering a living intact fetus, purposefully inserting an
instrument into the skull of the intact fetus, and utilizing a suction device to remove the skull
contents. This definition does not include the dilation and evacuation procedure involving dis-
memberment prior to removal, the suction curettage procedure, or the suction aspiration pro-
cedure for abortion.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
42. See generally infra notes 143-94 and accompanying text (discussing vagueness objections);
see also ACOG, Statement on Intact D&X, supra note 8 ("The debate regarding legislation to pro-
hibit a method of abortion, such as the legislation banning 'partial birth abortion,' and 'brain sucking
abortions,' has prompted questions regarding these procedures. It is difficult to respond to these
questions because the descriptions are vague and do not delineate a specific procedure recognized in
the medical literature. Moreover, the definitions could be interpreted to include elements of many
recognized abortion and operative obstetric techniques."); ACOG, Statement on H.R. 1833, supra
note 23 (stating that "in defining what medical procedures doctors may or may not perform, the bill
employs terminology that is not even recognized in the medical community--demonstrating why
congressional opinion should never be substituted for professional medical judgment"); National
Abortion Federation, supra note 23, at 3 ("[The phrase 'partial-birth abortion'] was invented solely
for use in this legislation, and is not a medical term. It was made up in an effort to find the most
inflammatory and upsetting term to use for this legislation. There is no such thing as a 'partial-birth
abortion,' and that is not what this procedure is.").
43. Dr. Martin Haskell, of Dayton, Ohio, first described his technique of "dilation and extrac-
tion," or "D&X," in 1992 at a meeting of abortion providers. See Martin Haskell, M.D., Dilation
and Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abortion, Presented at the National Abortion Federation
Risk Management Seminar (Sept 13, 1992), reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 5-12. Dr.
Haskell was the plaintiff in Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (enjoining enforcement of Ohio's statute banning his technique), aft'd, 130 F.3d
187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934). Dr. Haskell
coined the term "Dilation and Extraction," or "D&X" to distinguish his technique "from dismem-
berment-type D&E's." Id. at 1066. This terminology is employed by the laws in both Ohio and
Utah. See supra note 41 and accompanying text Nonetheless, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit found the language unconstitutional because in its view Ohio's statutory definition
encompassed both the D&E and D&X procedures. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200-02.
44. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (explaining that "Intact dilation and evacua-
tion" was the name Dr. McMahon gave to his version of the technique).
45. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1066-67 n.19 (noting that "Dr. John Doe Number Two,
who uses Haskell's D & X procedure in situations where an intact fetus is requested, or if the fetus
is breech (feet first), testified that he considers the D & X procedure to be a modification of the D
& E procedure"); see also Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200 (noting doctors' testimony).
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ond trimester abortions before the twentieth week.46 Dr. Martin Haskell,
of Dayton, Ohio, the developer of D&X (the procedure most commonly
singled out by proponents of the ban and the term that will be used
throughout most of this article), has stated that he "routinely performs
this procedure on all patients 20 through 24 weeks." 47 The late Dr. James
T. McMahon, of Los Angeles, California,41 was reputed to have per-
formed his similar "intact D&E" procedure not only on late second tri-
mester pregnancies but also in circumstances involving non-elective abor-
tions arising during the third trimester.49
46. See generally W~AE M. HRNs, ABOMrON PAnArC 126-56 (1984). The first step in a di-
lation and evacuation (D&E) procedure is the dilation of the woman's cervix. See id. at 126. This is
accomplished through the use of laminaria which are placed in the cervix before the procedure and
which gradually cause the dilation and softening of the cervix that are necessary to make the cervix
large enough for the fetus to pass through. See id. Very early in the second trimester, this can be ac-
complished using one laminaria placed twenty-four hours before the procedure; however, by the fif-
teenth week more laminaria changed more frequently are necessary for the required amount of dila-
tion and softening of the cervix. See id. at 126, 148. Twenty minutes before the procedure, the
laminaria are removed and the vagina is rinsed. See id. at 148. Having been softened with the lami-
naria, the cervix is then manually dilated to the appropriate size. See id. The appropriate size of the
cervix increases as the gestational length increases to accommodate the larger size of the fetus as
well as of the instruments required as time goes on. See it at 148-49. Once the cervix is adequately
dilated, the physician, using forceps and/or suction curettage, dismembers the fetus and removes it,
piece by piece, from the uterus. See id. at 149-50. The physician must proceed gently so as not to
damage the cervix or the uterine wall. See id. at 150.
47. Haskell, supra note 43, at 28, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 6. Specifi-
cally, Dr. Haskell was referring to gestation measured since the patient's last menstrual period. See
id. Haskell also stated that he performed the procedure "on selected patients 25 through 26 weeks
LM." Id. He has since stated that the latest be will perform an abortion is in the 24th week. See
Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 36 (transcript from the Voinovich trial). The "exceptions" cited in
the text include women over 22 weeks' gestation with a history of a prior cesarean section, obese
patients, patients beyond 21 weeks pregnancy with twins, and patients seeking abortions at 26 weeks
or beyond. See Haskell, supra note 43, at 28, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 6.
48. Dr. McMahon specialized in late term abortions, including those performed as a result of
medical necessity in the third trimester. See Roy Rivenburg, Partial Truths in the PR War Over a
Form of Late-Term Abortions, Both Sides Are Guilty of Manipulating the Facts. Here's What They
Are (and Aren't) Saying, LA. TimSs, Apr. 2, 1997, at El. His work at the Eve Surgical Center in Los
Angeles led to the development of the intact D&E procedure. See id. Dr. McMahon performed late
term abortions, usually of deformed fetuses or on sick mothers, until his death in 1995. See id.
Before his death, Dr. McMahon submitted to Congress his research analyzing the reasons for many
of his patients' abortions. See id. He reported that 9% were for maternal health reasons, most often
depression or rape, and 54% were for serious fetal defects such as anencephaly or congenital heart
disease. See id.; see also Bonavoglia, supra note 33, at 59 (describing Dr. McMahon's research).
49. See Bonavoglia, supra note 33, at 59 ("Dr. McMahon, on the other hand, performed pri-
marily medically indicated abortions in both the late second and third trimester, by intact D&E.");
David Brown, Late Term Abortions; Who Gets Them and Why, WAsm. PosT, Sept. 17, 1996, at Z12
("In a letter written in 1993 to doctors who referred patients to him, [Dr. McMahon] said that in
1991 he'd done 65 third-trimester abortions. All of these cases, he said, were 'nonelective.' ").
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The surgical technique referred to involves removal of the fetus in
an intact condition-that is, without the prior dismemberment which
characterizes D&E s° According to Dr. Haskell, he begins by administer-
ing dilators to the patient on each of two succeeding days before sur-
gery.51 The brief surgery itself entails the use of ultrasound and forceps
to extract the lower extremities and torso of the fetus from the woman's
body, after which the physician inserts a suction device into the skull and
removes its contents, in order to facilitate complete extraction without the
dangers of hemorrhage or tearing of the woman's membranes. 52
The D&X procedure differs from the D&E abortion method rou-
tinely used from weeks thirteen through nineteen in that the latter in-
volves dilation followed by dismemberment in the uterus prior to re-
moval.53 After nineteen weeks' gestation, the skull-particularly the
jawbone-is likely to be too large for the safe utilization of the D&E
method.54 In the first case to challenge a state legislative prohibition of
D&X on constitutional grounds, Women's Medical Professional Corp. v.
Voinovich,55 the trial judge described the procedure as "a variant of the D
& E technique." 56 In support of his order staying enforcement of Ohio's
restrictive law, the trial judge noted that "doctors who use the procedure
may not know which procedure they will perform until they encounter
particular surgical variables and circumstances after they begin the proce-
dure to terminate the pregnancy." 57
50. See Haskell, supra note 43, at 27, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 5.
51. See id. at 29.
52. See id. at 29-31.
53. See id. at 27.
54. See id. at 28; House Hearing, supra note 23, at 16 (citing sources); see also infra notes
61-64, 377-80 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of D&X or intact D&E); c-f HERN
supra note 46, at 154 (noting difficulties of using D&E after the fetal tissue becomes cohesive).
55. 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aft'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934).
56. Id. at 1066.
57. Id. at 1066-67; cf House Hearing, supra note 23, at 65 (statement of L Courtland Robin-
son, M.D.). Dr. Courtland stated the following:.
Sometimes, as any doctor will tell you, you begin a surgical procedure expecting that it
will go one way, only to discover that a unique demand, the case requires you to do some-
thing different. Telling a physician that it's illegal for him or her to adapt a certain surgical
method for the safety of the patient is absolutely criminal and flies in the face of the stan-
dards for the quality of medical care.
For many physicians, this law (the federal "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995"]
would amount to a ban on D&E entirely, because they would not undertake a surgery if they
were legally prohibited from completing it in the best way they saw fit at the time the proce-
dure was being done.
Id.; accord Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1298-99 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (statement of Dr. Evans).
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B. Advantages Claimed for D&X Over the Alternatives
The current alternative for abortion during the twentieth week of a
pregnancy and beyond is induction or instillation, which involves the use
of a saline substance to effectuate fetal demise, followed by administra-
tion of a drug to induce labor 5 8 The process typically takes between
twelve and twenty-four hours, but may last longer.59 Another possibility
is a hysterotomy, which is basically a caesarean section performed before
term; however, doctors today prefer to avoid this method, because of its
attendant surgical risks.6
The advantages cited by proponents of D&X over available alterna-
tives are that, compared to induction, D&X involves less potential blood
loss; is less likely to result in tearing of the woman's membranes; is
more protective of future fertility; does not require hospitalization; and
requires less time.61 Genetic testing, useful for tracing the source of fetal
58. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068 ("Induction methods are also known as 'instillation'
methods. In one type of induction method, the physician injects some substance-typically saline, or
a combination of a prostaglandin and urea-into the amniotic cavity of the woman. In another type,
the physician places prostaglandin suppositories into the patient's vagina. In both cases, the end re-
sult is labor the substances cause the uterus to contract, resulting in the eventual expulsion of the
fetus."); see also HeRN, supra note 46, at 123-26 (describing this method in more detail).
59. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068.
60. See U at 1070 ("Finally, the Court finds that the D & X procedure appears to pose less
of a risk to maternal health than either a hysterotomy or a hysterectomy, both of which are major,
traumatic surgeries."); HERN, supra note 46, at 123 ("Hysterotomy has been almost completely
abandoned because of its associated high morbidity.").
61. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1069; accord Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 516
(D. Neb. 1997) (citing expert who "believes the D & X procedure is 'an advance in technology' be-
cause by removing the fetus intact there is 'less instrument manipulation,' which means, 'of course,
the higher your safety' ") (citation omitted); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 50 (contain-
ing portions of the trial transcript introduced into the record by Sen. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee); infra notes 377-80 and accompanying text (discussing advantages as seen by
advocates of the technique). Dr. Haskell, in response to a question stated that:
The advantage of [the D&X] procedure is that because it is done intact with ultrasound
guidance to do the version to remove intact, the placenta is not disrupted. Even with a bad
lie, the procedure, the placenta is not disrupted. And there's no bleeding until after the fetus
is removed.
So, it passes a lot of the common sense techniques of surgery that we learn in our very
basic surgery day [by] minimizing trauma, minimizing blood loss, and shortening surgical
time.
Id. Also, Martin Ruddock, an Ohio physician, believes D&X is safer than its most common
alternative,
which is called "dismemberment dilation and evacuation." In that procedure, the fetus is re-
moved in pieces, generally limbs first. It requires that the surgeon exert a great deal of force
on the fetus inside the uterus, and it often produces sharp, bony fragments that can damage a
woman's reproductive organs.
Brown, supra note 49; see also Painter, supra note 24 ("But after 20 weeks, 'dismembering the fe-
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abnormalities and in helping a couple's future family planning, is also
possible when the fetus is intact.62 Additionally, the patient experiences
less discomfort and stress.63 Finally, the psychological benefit of seeing
and even holding an intact fetus is an advantage the patient realizes by
choosing the D&X method.64
C. Incidence of Use of the Procedure
Despite the attention and publicity accorded to the D&X abortion
procedure, the potential extent of its use is actually quite small. Accord-
ing to the Alan Guttmacher Institute,6s which tracks abortion statistics, as
of 1992 only about 1% of all abortions (about 16,450 in that year)6 are
performed at twenty-one weeks LMP67 or more.6s This 1% represents the
tus becomes more difficult,' Hem says. 'It increases the risk of the operation. It increases the dis-
comfort for the woman.' ").
62. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 75 (statement of Tammy Watts).
We made another painful decision shortly after the abortion. Dr. McMahon called and
said, "This will be very difficult, but I have to ask you this. Given the anomalies [Watts'
aborted daughter] had, so vast and different, there is a program at Cedars-Sinai which is try-
ing to find out the causes for why this happens. They would like to accept her into this pro-
gram." I said, "I know what that means. Autopsies and the whole realm of testing." But we
decided, how can we not do this? If I can keep one family from going through what we went
through, it would make her life have some meaning. So they're doing the testing now. And
because Dr. McMahon does the procedure the way he does, it made the testing possible.
Id.; see also HR. REP. No. 104-267, at 32 (1995) (letter from Dru Elaine Carlson, M.D., to Rep.
Schroeder) ("[Fetuses] are delivered intact and that allows us ... to evaluate them carefully.... We
work with Dr. McMahon in evaluating many of the malformed fetuses ... to try and provide the
clearest and most precise diagnosis we can for our families as to why this happened to them.").
63. See, e.g., Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068 ("One obvious disadvantage of the induction
method is that it results in labor, with all of its potential complications. These may include: fear,
lack of control, mild to severe abdominal pain, nausea, and diarrhea, and extreme discomfort, over a
lengthy period of time.").
64. See, e.g., House Hearink, supra note 23, at 72 (statement of Tammy Watts) ("Thanks to
the [intact D&E] procedure that Dr. McMahon uses in terminating these pregnancies, we got to hold
her and be with her and love her and have pictures for a couple of hours, which was wonderful and
heartbreaking all at once. They had her wrapped in a blanket. We spent some time with her, said our
goodbyes, and went back to the hotel."); HR. Rm. No. 104-267, at 32 (letter from Dru Elaine Carl-
son, MD., to Rep. Schroeder) ("[Tihey are delivered intact and that allows ... families to touch
and acknowledge their baby in saying goodbye.").
65. The Institute describes itself as a "Not-for-Profit Corporation for Reproductive Health Re-
search, Policy Analysis and Public Education." Alan Guttmacher Institute, Facts in Brief. Abortion
in the United States 1 (1995).
66. See Bonavoglia, supra note 33, at 58.
67. "LMP" as a measure of pregnancy refers to a woman's last menstrual period. See Alan
Guttmacher Institute, supra note 65, at 2.
68. See id. The Institute states that of the 1.5 million abortions performed annually as of 1992,
over 89% take place in the first trimester of pregnancy. See id. Another 6% occur at thirteen-to-
fifteen weeks LMP, with 4% at sixteen-to-twenty weeks. See id.
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population for whom the D&X procedure might be an option6 The Alan
Guttmacher Institute further estimates that only about six hundred abor-
tions annually, or 0.04%, occur after twenty-six weeks;70 some of these
women may also be candidates for D&X or a similar procedure.
7'
Although information about actual frequency of D&X procedures is
difficult to obtain, the number is clearly far less than even the 1% figure
might suggest. However, the figure is also clearly higher than that sug-
gested by statements published at the time of the public debate on the
"Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995,"72 when the National Abortion
Federation estimated that "[biased on documentation from the two pri-
mary physicians using the procedure, approximately 450 abortions per
year are performed this way."' ' When the issue resurfaced in the spring
of 1997, Ron Fitzsimmons, Executive Director of the National Coalition
of Abortion Providers, admitted that the numbers were considerably
higher than previously reported.74 Other abortion rights leaders agreed,
and eventually statistics emerged suggesting the possibility of several
thousand abortions per year that employ D&X or a variation of D&X.75
69. Dr. Martin Haskell has stated that he "routinely performs this procedure on all patients 20
through 24 weeks." Haskell, supra note 43, at 28, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 6.
70. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, supra note 65, at 2.
71. See Brown, supra note 49 (stating that the late Dr. James T. McMahon performed this pro-
cedure for therapeutic post-viability abortions). On the other hand, despite an earlier statement that
he would sometimes perform his D&X procedure on selected patients 25 through 26 weeks LMP,
Dr. Haskell recently testified that he now only uses the D&X procedure for abortions during the 21st
to 24th week of gestation. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 36. Note that this statement also
contrasts with Dr. Haskell's earlier indications that he would use the D&X procedure for abortions
performed during the twentieth week. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In 1993, a reporter
who interviewed Dr. Haskell quoted him as stating that he performed abortions " 'up until about 25
weeks' " gestation, but specifically noted the importance that he attached to the distinction between
second trimester and third trimester abortions, "adding that his cutoff point is within the viability
threshold noted in Roe v. Wade." Gianelli, supra note 33, at 16. He has not published exact figures
reflecting his own practice, although his testimony in the lawsuit where he served as plaintiff refers
to "approximately 1,000 D&X procedures performed after the twentieth week of pregnancy." Wo-
men's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1069 (S.D. Ohio 1995), affid, 130 F.3d
187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934). Dr. Haskell
particularly noted that in that number "there were no serious complications." Id
72. See H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995).
73. National Abortion Federation, supra note 23, at 3 (citing personal interviews with Dr.
Martin Haskell and Dr. James McMahon, as well as National Abortion Federation quarterly
statistics).
74. See Gianelli, supra note 21, at 3.
75. See id. vicki Saporta, of the National Abortion Federation, was quoted as saying "the
numbers are greater than we initially estimated." Id. Other sources referred to numbers that, taken
together, suggest that several thousand such procedures are performed each year. See id. ("[D]octors
who use the technique acknowledged doing thousands of such procedures a year. .. . [A Bergen
County, NJ.] paper reported last fall that physicians at one facility perform an estimated 3,000 abor-
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Undoubtedly, legislative stirrings on state and federal levels over the
past two years have contributed to underreporting of the incidence of the
use of D&X, although available data still indicate that the procedure is
rare.76 In any event, so long as the decisions to abort at all (using any
medically acceptable procedure) are legal under the RoelCasey frame-
work, the number of doctors using the D&X technique or the number of
such procedures performed should make no difference with respect to the
legal status of the D&X procedure itself.
77
D. Reasons for Use of the Procedure
Like the controversy surrounding the numbers, the reasons why the
D&X procedure is used have also been the subject of conflicting reports.
When the issue first appeared on the public stage in 1995, forces op-
posed to the ban offered statements that the D&X technique was used
only in extreme cases of wanted pregnancies where the woman's life or
health was placed at serious risk or where severe fetal abnormalities were
discovered too late in the pregnancy for the D&E method to be used
safely and effectively. 78 President Clinton's veto of the "Partial-Birth
tions a year on fetuses between 20 and 24 weeks, of which at least half are by intact D&E."). At
the Voinovich trial, Dr. Martin Haskell testified to approximately 1,000 D&X procedures performed
by him after the twentieth week of pregnancy with "no serious complications." Voinovich, 911 F.
Supp. at 1069. The trial judge in that case also found that "[a]t least three doctors in Ohio perform
some variation of the D & X procedure: Plaintiff Haskell; Dr. John Doe Number One; and Dr. John
Doe Number Two." Id. at 1070 (citation omitted). Note, however, that some doctors reporting them-
selves as performing "intact D&E" procedures administered lethal drugs to the fetus beforehand. See
Gianelli, supra note 21, at 3 (citing a doctor in Bellevue, Neb.). This fact would take their behavior
outside the scope of the federal bill and any similarly worded laws that refer to "a living fetus." See
supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
76. See Bonavoglia, supra note 33, at 58 ("Overall, the number of abortions performed in the
late second and third trimester is comparatively low. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, of
the 1.5 million abortions done annually in the U.S., 1 percent, or 16,450, are done after 20 weeks.
Of those, around 10,340 are done from 21 to 22 weeks; 4,940 from 23 to 24 weeks; 850 from 25 to
26 weeks; and after 26 weeks, somewhere between 320 and 600, or an estimated 4/100ths of one
percent, are performed."); Rivenburg, supra note 48 (explaining conflicting data but concluding that
procedure is rare).
77. Pro-choice leaders have made the same point. See, e.g., Gianelli, supra note 21, at 3.
78. See National Abortion Federation, supra note 23, at 3. The National Abortion Federation,
the professional association of abortion providers, claimed that this was the situation "in the majority
of cases." Id. Other factors identified in a statement issued by the Federation in 1995 included such
maternal health problems as cancer, kidney failure, or the sudden flare-up of a previous condition,
such as brittle diabetes; situations of rape or incest, where the woman had been unable to confront
the reality earlier, and difficulties in diagnosing the pregnancy itself, which may occur, for example,
when women believe they are undergoing early menopause, or when they have irregular menstrual
cycles. See id. at 2, 5. Burdensome laws, including parental consent statutes, mandatory waiting peri-
ods, and prohibitions against government financial aid for poor women seeking abortions were also
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Abortion Ban Act of 1995" was premised largely on the fact that the
targeted procedure was primarily used for reasons of maternal health, a
concern which he apparently considered broad enough to encompass se-
vere fetal anomaly.79
Accompanying President Clinton at that veto ceremony were "five
women [who] sometimes tearfully described having had such [late term
D&X] abortions after being told by their doctors that they faced poten-
tially fatal harm if they carried their pregnancies to term."80 One of these
women, Vicki Stella of Chicago, had been told that "her fetus had no
brain," and, because she is a diabetic she doesn't "heal as well as other
people, so other procedures just were not the answer."81 Upon choosing
the D&X method Vicki reasoned that, "I didn't make the decision for
my child to die, God made the decision for my child to die."
8 2
Testimony at both the House 3 and Senate84 committee hearings in
1995 bore out the President's perceptions. For example, a woman named
Tammy Watts related to the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on the Constitution her experience upon learning, seven months into her
pregnancy, that the fetus was afflicted with trisomy-13, a syndrome of
severe fetal anomalies with which the child cannot live.85 Ms. Watts had
cited as factors in some late-term cases cited by the Federation as typical D&X factual situations.
See id. at 6.
79. See Ann Devroy, Late-Term Abortion Ban Vetoed; 'Small But Vulnerable' Group of Wo-
men Needs Procedure, Clinton Says, WAsm. Posr, Apr. 11, 1996, at Al (noting that "Clinton had
said he could allow the ban only if it contained an exception for women who faced serious health
consequences"); see also Goodstein, supra note 25 (noting that in rejecting the ban, Clinton had said
"that this particular procedure was used very rarely and usually only when the fetus was suffering
severe birth defects, or when the health of the mother was at risk").
80. Devroy, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 71-76 (statement of Tammy Watts).
84. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 158-65 (testimony of Coreen Costello, statement of
Vicki Wilson, and statement of Jeannie French).
85. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 71-72 (statement of Tammy Watts). Trisomy-13 is a
severe form of mental retardation that occurs when the fetus has three, instead of only two, copies of
Chromosome 13. See Laura Muha, Learning Terrible Truths; Heart-Wrenching Choices After Testing
Fetuses for Gene Defects, Series: ON THE GENETIC FRONTIER, NEWSDAY, OcL 22, 1990, at 7.
Common effects of Trisomy-13 are incomplete brain development, small head size, cleft palate, and
deformities of the hands, feet, and heart. See id. Trisomy-13 occurs in one out of every 10,000 births
in the United States; ninety percent of those born with Trisomy-13 die within the first year, and only
about one percent live to be ten. See Peggy Fletcher, Ethics of Intervention; Treat Babies With Ge-
netic Defect? Yes, Parents Say, SALT LAKE TRm., Nov. 30, 1995, at Cl. A common cause of death
of children with Trisomy-13 is apnea, which occurs because the brain is often so poorly developed
that it does not signal the lungs to breathe. See Jonathan Bor, A Sentence of Death, A Life of Hope
Support: Group Defies the Odds in Genetic Disorder, BALT. SuN, June 28, 1992, at 1A.
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undergone routine testing, including ultrasound and an alphafetoprotein
test, earlier in her pregnancy, but the condition had remained unde-
tected.86 The decision she and her husband made to terminate the preg-
nancy was "elective" in the sense that she could have carried the child
to term, knowing it would die shortly after birth.87 Feeling, however, that
"[w]e could never have survived that," the Watts made an immediate ap-
pointment with Dr. McMahon in Los Angeles. 88 They were particularly
grateful that the procedure enabled them to "say goodbye" to the intact
fetus that was handed to them in a blanket. 89 Also gratifying to the
Watts, under the circumstances, was the fact that the procedure permitted
the fetus to be used, with their permission, for research into trisomy-13
in an effort to discover its underlying cause.90
In a document of Dissenting Views appended to the House Report,
women members of the House Judiciary Committee buttressed Ms.
Watts' testimony with citations to the experiences of other women forced
to terminate wanted pregnancies at late stages.91 These poignant cases-
in each of which the attending physician thought that D&X or intact
D&E was more preservative of maternal health and future fertility than
any alternative method-offered strong examples of reasons not to ban
the D&X procedure. 92
Recent evidence, however, suggests that it would be erroneous to
consider these cases typical or to think that they constitute a majority of
the pre-viability cases, as previously claimed. Instead, abortion rights
leaders have acknowledged that a large percentage of pre-viability D&X
86. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 71 (statement of Tammy Watts).
87. See id. at 72 ("I had a choice. I could have carried this pregnancy to term, knowing that
everything was wrong. I could have gone on for 2 more months doing everything that an expectant
mother does, but knowing my baby was going to die, and would probably suffer a great deal before
dying.").
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 73 (statement of Tammy Watts) ("Because Dr. Mc-
Mahon does the procedure the way he does, it made the testing possible."); see also HR. REP. No.
104-267, at 32 (1995) (letter from Dm Elaine Carlson, M.D., to Rep. Schroeder, discussing, inter
alia, the fact that Dr. McMahon's technique made possible post-abortion examination and testing).
91. See HR. REP. No. 104-267, at 28-29 (additional dissenting views of Congresswomen
Schroeder, Lofgren, and Jackson-Lee) (describing the situations of Vild Wilson and Vicky Smith, as
well as Tammy Watts, and attributing the preservation of their health and fertility to the use of "this
safe procedure").
92. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 158 (statement of Coreen Costello). Costello, an
anti-abortionist, described her experience with intact D&E after her seven-month fetus with severe
abnormalities became life-endangering to her when she stated- "This was the safest way for me to
deliver. This left open the possibility of more children, it greatly lowered the risk of my death, and
most important to me, it offered a peaceful, painless passing for Katherine Grace." Id. at 159.
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cases, like the overwhelming percentage of pre-viability abortions, gener-
ally, are elective procedures involving healthy women and fetuses. 93 To
the extent that the D&X procedure is employed for post-viability abor-
tions, the cases described undoubtedly would be typical, as the Roel
Casey framework permits a state to prohibit all post-viability abortions
except those necessary to preserve the woman's life or health.94 However,
just as the number of D&X procedures performed is irrelevant to the is-
sue of the legality of the technique, so are the reasons for the abortion,
where the decision in favor of abortion-whether pre-viability or post-
viability-is otherwise legal under established Supreme Court precedent.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL PICTURE
A. The Controversy on the Federal Level
So-called "partial-birth abortion" legislation first came to public at-
tention in the late spring of 1995, when Representative Charles Canady
introduced into the House of Representatives95 the bill that became the
"Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995." 96 A great deal of public me-
dia attention 97 accompanied the bill as it made its way through commit-
93. See Gianelli, supra note 21, at 3 (citing Ron Fitzsimmons, Executive Director of the Na-
tional Coalition of Abortion Providers, as stating that abortion rights supporters in the past had failed
to acknowledge that "the vast majority of these abortions are performed in the 20-plus week range
on healthy fetuses and healthy mothers"). The same article goes on to note that other doctors who
utilize the procedure have discredited earlier claims about both the numbers and the reasons in-
volved. See id.
94. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
95. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 4 (exhibiting letter dated June 18, 1995, from the
office of Charles T. Canady, signed by him and Rep. Vucanovich, informing colleagues of their plan
to introduce the bill the following week).
96. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995).
97. See, e.g., Ann Hardie, Abortion Procedure is Rare But Divisive, ATLANTA J. & CoNST.,
Mar. 31, 1996, at A8 ("The U.S. House of Representatives voted 286 to 129 ... to ban the rare
late-term abortion procedure, but President Clinton's promised veto of the bill probably will
stick.... Still, it marked the first time Congress has moved to ban a specific abortion method since
the U.S. Supreme Court legalized abortion in 1973."); Carol Jouzaitis, Senate to Hold Hearings on
Abortion Bill: Both Sides View Delay as Potential Victory for Their Cause, Cm. Ttu., Nov. 9, 1995,
at 8 ("In an immediate victory for abortion rights forces, the Senate voted Wednesday to delay ac-
tion on a bill outlawing certain late-term abortions until the Judiciary Committee holds public hear-
ings."); Kevin Merida, Antiabortion Measures Debated: House Republicans Push for New Restric-
tions in Several Areas, WAsm PoST, June 14, 1995, at A4 ("One highly emotional issue that will get
an airing . . . before a House Judiciary subcommittee chaired by [Rep. Charles T.] Canady is his
proposal to ban 'partial-birth' abortions."); Panel OK's a Curb on Abortions: House Measure Targets
a Late-Term Procedure, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 1995, at 3 ("A bill to outlaw some late-term abor-
tions gained the House Judiciary Committee's approval .... After nearly three hours of passionate
and partisan debate, the panel sent the measure to the House floor on a party-line vote of 20-12.");
John E. Yang, House Sends Clinton Curb on Abortions; Late-Term Method Would Be Banned, WAs.
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tees of both houses of Congress. 8 In April 1996, the House passed the
measure by a veto-proof margin of 286-129, but the Senate support of
54-44 fell short of the two-thirds majority necessary for a veto override. 99
President Clinton vetoed the measure on April 10, 1996, stating that it
concerned a "potentially life-saving, certainly health-saving" procedure
for "a small but extremely vulnerable group of women and families in
this country, just a few hundred a year."' ° Reaction from both pro-
choice and pro-life groups was swift and sharp: the former tended to see
the issue as one more attempt by anti-abortion forces to chip away at a
woman's basic right to choose,101 while the latter considered this particu-
lar treatment of "unborn human beings"' t 2 to amount to homicide during
what was essentially a birth process. 03
Posr, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al ("The House intensified the emotionally wrenching election-year debate
over abortion ... by giving final congressional approval to a bill that would outlaw a rarely used
technique to end pregnancies in their late stages.").
98. Hearings were held before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary
Committee on June 15, 1995. See House Hearing, supra note 23. By a 20-12 vote, the Subcommit-
tee issued a favorable Report on September 27. See HR REP. No. 104-267, at 17 (1995). The Report
contained a minority report of Dissenting Views, subscribed by the fourteen committee members
who had voted against it: Representatives John Conyers, Jr.; Pat Schroeder, Barney Frank; Charles E.
Schumer, Howard L. Berman; John Bryant; Jack Reed; Jerrold Nadler- Bobby Scott; Melvin L. Watt;
Xavier Beccera; Jose E. Serrano; Zoe Lofgren; and Sheila Jackson-Lee. See id. at 27. An additional
Dissenting Views statement was submitted by the three female Representatives in this group, Pat
Schroeder, Zoe Lofgren, and Sheila Jackson-Lee, along with an Appendix consisting of a letter to
the Hon. Patricia Schroeder from Dru Elaine Carlson, M.D., the Director of Reproductive Genetics
and a perinatologist and geneticist at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles. See id. at 28, 31.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings on November 17, 1995. See Senate
Hearing, supra note 23.
99. See Devroy, supra note 79.
100. i
101. See, e.g., Letter from Ann Thompson Cook, Executive Director, Religious Coalition for
Reproductive Choice (an organization representing 38 national religious groups) to President Clinton
(Apr. 10, 1996) (on file with the author) ("We salute you for taking a strong stand in solidarity with
women and their families."); Letter from Ralph W. Hale, M.D., Executive Director, ACOG, to Presi-
dent Clinton (Apr. 9, 1996) ("[l1n defining what medical procedures doctors may or may not per-
form, HR 1833 employs terminology that is not even recognized in the medical community--demon-
strating why Congressional opinion should never be substituted for professional medical judgment.
Accordingly, ACOG supports your decision to veto this legislation."); National Abortion Federation,
News Release: Families Who Needed Later Abortions to Join President Clinton for Veto of Anti-
Choice Legislation (Apr. 10, 1996) ("President Clinton is putting a stop to one of the most anti-
family bills ever passed in Congress.").
102. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 2 (in his opening statement, Subcommittee Chairman
Charles Canady used this phrase and went on to note: "Partial-birth abortion procedures go a step
beyond abortion on demand. The baby involved is not unborn. His or her life is taken during a
breech delivery.").
103. See id. at 1 (opening statement of Chairman Canady) ("This hearing focuses on partial-
birth abortion because while every abortion sadly takes a human life, this method takes that life as
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The issue never died down during the Presidential election year of
1996,104 particularly as further information surfaced concerning both
greater usage of the D&X procedure than previously believed and a
wider variety of contextual medical circumstances than earlier por-
trayed.1 5 In the meantime, a number of states began to enact or at least
consider bills banning the D&X procedure. 106
the baby emerges from the mother's womb while the baby is in the birth canal. The difference be-
tween the partial-birth abortion procedure and homicide is a mere 3 inches."); Senate Hearing, supra
note 23, at 116 (statement of Helen M. Alvare, Esq., on behalf of the National Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities). Alvare testified:
No reasonable person can disagree, once he or she has read a description or seen an ac-
curate drawing of the partial-birth abortion method: it is one-fifth abortion and four-fifths in-
fanticide. It kills a child when 80 percent of his or her body is already outside the womb.
And there should certainly be a moral and legal consensus in our country that infanticide is a
crime. That it simply cannot be tolerated in a civilized society. That it is a particularly hei-
nous kind of killing because the victims are small, weak and defenseless as the very youngest
infants are.
Id. But see Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 200 (comment of Louis Michael Seidman, Prof. of
Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Washington, D.C.) ("If people seriously thought it was infanti-
cide, they wouldn't be talking about punishing it for 2 years. The reason why Congress is interested
in punishing this-why some Members of Congress are interested in punishing it is not because it is
infanticide. It is precisely because it is abortion.").
104. See Chris Black, House Overrides Abortion Bill Veto: Late-Term Procedure Vote Called
Election-Year Ploy, BosroN GLOB, Sept. 20, 1996, at Al ("The House yesterday voted to override
President Clinton's veto of a bill that outlaws a controversial late-term abortion procedure even as
opponents of the bill accused the GOP leadership of playing election-year abortion politics.... Dole
says he supports the ban."); John F. Harris & Blaine Harden, Clinton, Dole Spar Over Abortion
Veto; Exchange Suggests Long Fight on Social Issues, WAsm Posr, May 24, 1996, at Al ("With a
flushed face, strained voice and pointed finger, President Clinton yesterday defended his 'moral posi-
tion' in vetoing a ban on a controversial late-term abortion procedure and accused Republicans of
using it and other emotionally charged social issues to polarize voters."); Melissa Healy, Senate Up-
holds Veto of Late-Term Abortion Ban: Congress Override Attempt Falls Nine Votes Short. Oppo-
nents of 'Partial-Birth' Procedure Hope to Make it a Campaign Issue, L.A. TiMAEs, Sept. 27, 1996, at
A13 ("Republican political analyst Ed Goeas said Clinton's veto has made him potentially vulnera-
ble with Americans and that the president's testy exchanges with reporters on the issue should em-
bolden Dole to go on the attack."); Gerald F. Seib & Hilary Stout, Dole Advocates Charity Tax
Credit, Blasts Clinton for Veto of Abortion Bill, WAUL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at B13 ("In a speech to
the Cqtholic Press Association in Philadelphia, Mr. Dole also stepped up the rhetorical battle with
the White House over abortion, drawing an angry reaction from President Clinton.... Mr. Clinton,
at a news conference in Milwaukee, accused the Republicans of using emotional social issues like
abortion and welfare to divide the public and divert voters from more pressing matters in their cam-
paign to reclaim the White House."); Hilary Stout, Campaign '96: Abortion Remains a Thorny Issue
for Clinton and GOP, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1996, at A20 ("President Clinton hoped to glide through
his re-election campaign trumpeting his view that abortion should be 'safe, legal and rare,' while
Republicans beat each other up over the emotional issue. The GOP is following the script. But sud-
denly the president isn't safe from abortion bruises either.").
105. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:301
"PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION" BANS
In March 1997, "The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997"107
was introduced into the House of Representatives by Charles Canady;1 8
it passed on March 20 by the veto-proof margin of 295-136.'09 Senator
Rick Santorum became the primary sponsor in the Senate." 0 That body
considered several proposals for amendment"' and fmally accepted one
107. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997).
108. See 143 CoNG. REc. H1202 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997) (statement of Rep. Canady) ("I call
up the bill (H.R. 1122) to amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions, and ask
for its immediate consideration in the House."); 143 CONG. REnC H766 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1997)
(Public Bills and Resolutions) (Mr. Canady, for himself and with many others introduced "[a] bill to
amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.").
109. See 143 CONG. Rnc_ H1201-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997) (recorded House vote on H.R.
1122); see also Melissa Healy, 'Partial-Birth' Abortion Ban Again Passes House, L.A. TWMEs, Mar.
21, 1997, at Al ("Abortion foes in the House on Thursday adopted a ban on a controversial late-
term abortion procedure for the third time in a year, challenging President Clinton to again veto a
bill that he vetoed last April."); Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Bans Form of Late Abortion; Bill Faces
Veto, N.Y. TIMaS, May 21, 1997, at Al (listing both House and Senate votes).
110. See 143 CoNG. Rac. S4431 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Santorum) ("Mr.
President, as I spoke last night, we are now moving to consideration of the partial-birth abortion ban
that has passed the House of Representatives .... "); 143 CONG. Rac. S2739 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
1997) (statement of Sen. Santonim) ("Mr. President, I understand that H.R. 1122 has arrived from
the House, and I would now ask for its first reading."); 143 CoNG. REa. S1936 (daily ed. Mar. 5,
1997) (statement of Sen. Santorum) ("Mr. President, this morning I attended a press conference ...
to introduce the House bill, which is companion to the bill I introduced last month, on the issue of
partial-birth abortions.").
111. See 143 CoNG. REc. S4614 (daily ed. May 15, 1997). Senator Feinstein proposed Amend-
ment Number 288, which would have been called the "Post-Viability Abortion Restriction Act" and
which would have prohibited abortions of viable fetuses unless abortion was necessary to save the
life of, or prevent "serious adverse health consequences to[,] the woman." Id. Senator Dasche pro-
posed Amendment Number 289, which would have been called the "Comprehensive Abortion Ban
Act of 1997" and would have also prohibited abortions of viable fetuses unless continuing the preg-
nancy would "threaten the mother's life or risk grievous injury to her physical health." Id at S4614-
15. Daschle's amendment defined "grievous injury" as "a severely debilitating disease or impair-
ment specifically caused by the pregnancy," or "an inability to provide necessary treatment for a
life-threatening condition" and said it would not include "any condition that is not medically
diagnosable or any condition for which termination of pregnancy is not medically indicated." Id. at
S4615; see also Dewar, Abortion Compromise Rejected, supra note 25 ("The proposal from Minority
Leader Thomas A. Dasche (D-S.D.) was defeated, 64 to 36, underscoring the difficulties of trying to
devise a middIe-ground position on the volatile abortion issue.... Clinton, Vice President Gore and
Health and Human Services Secretary Donna E. Shalala made telephone calls on behalf of Daschie's
proposal [the day before] .... Before voting on the Dasche proposal, the Senate rejected, 72 to 28,
a proposal sponsored by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Calif.) and other Democratic female senators
.... "); Clarence Page, Editorial, Abortion Foes Miss Opportunity, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH, June
1, 1997, at 3B ("So, while Santorum and his anti-abortion allies claimed they wanted to 'save' ba-
bies, they really wanted to embarrass Clinton .... So, for the first time since Roe, the Daschle bill
actually would have strengthened the ability of states to ban abortions and expand the period during
which the lives of fetuses are protected. And, unlike the Santorum bill, Clinton said he would sign
it."); Katharine Q. Seelye, Day of Flurry and Debate On Late-Term Abortions, N.Y. Tams, May 15,
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offered by Senator Santorum which contained two major provisions: (1) a
definition of the term, "vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the
fetus";112 and (2) a provision for an accused defendant to seek a hearing
before the relevant State Medical Board on the question of whether the
defendant's conduct was "necessary to save the life of the mother whose
life was endangered by a physical disorder, illness or injury."113 The
Board's findings on the issue would be admissible at the defendant's
criminal trial, although not binding.114
According to Senator Santorum, the amendment was worked out by
himself, Senator Frist, Representative Canady, and the AMA in order to
tighten the definition of "partial-birth abortion" to ensure the necessary
criminal mens rea and in order to provide a medical review panel as an
intermediary between the physician whose conduct is called into question
and the criminal process.115 This would serve the dual purpose of provid-
ing both peer review of the physician's conduct and medical expertise for
the benefit of the trial court.116 On May 20, after a "listless debate,"
117
the Senate passed the amended bill by a vote of 64-36-three votes short
of the number needed to override a Presidential veto, which Clinton
promised on account of the bill's failure to include an exception to pre-
serve the health, as well as the life, of the pregnant woman.118 On Octo-
ber 8, the House approved the amended bill overwhelmingly, 296-132,
and Clinton signed his veto the following day in the oval office.119
Charles Canady predicted that Congress would not vote again until 1998,
1997, at B14 ("The White House did nothing today to clarify the Administration's view. Michael D.
McCurry, the White House spokesman, said on Tuesday that President Clinton might support the
Daschle bill. Today he said the President could support either the Daschle bill or the Feinstein-Boxer
bill.").
112. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
113. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong.
114. See id. The relevant portion of the amendment provides:
(d)(1) A defendant accused of an offense under this section may seek a hearing before
the State Medical Board on whether the physician's conduct was necessary to save the life of
the mother whose life was endangered by a physical disorder, illness, or injury.
(2) The findings on that issue are admissible on that issue at the trial of the defendant.
Upon a motion of the defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the trial for not more
than 30 days to permit such a hearing to take place.
Id.
115. See 143 CONG. REc. S4694 (daily ed. May 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
116. See id. at S4696 (statement of Sen. Santorum).
117. Seelye, supra note 109.
118. See id.
119. See Clinton Vetoes Ban on Some Abortions, WAsH. Posr, Oct. 11, 1997, at All [hereinaf-
ter Clinton Vetoes]; John E. Yang, House Again Votes to Ban Abortion Procedure, WASH PoST, Oct.
9, 1997, at A8.
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to give Senate leaders time to try to amass sufficient support for an
override.120
B. Actions in the States
National attention to this issue also has been reflected in actions
taken by state legislatures during the past two years. Already, the states
are beginning to keep the courts busy. Ohio, where Dr. Martin Haskell,
the developer of D&X, maintains two abortion clinics,121 was the first
state to enact a ban: the law passed Ohio's General Assembly on August
15, 1995,1' eight months before President Clinton's veto of the first fed-
eral bill.'2 Ohio's law was to become effective on November 15, 1995,124
but enforcement was stayed by a federal district judge on the basis of a
substantial likelihood that the proposed statute was unconstitutional. 25
His grant of an injunction was recently affirmed by a divided panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the first federal
appellate court to hear the issue.126 Utah'2v and Michigan'2 passed similar
prohibitions in the spring of 1996, but a federal district court issued a
permanent injunction against enforcement of Michigan's law on July 31,
1997.129
In 1997, sixteen other states enacted laws prohibiting what they call
"partial-birth abortion.' 30 Nine of these (besides the laws in Ohio and
Michigan) have been stayed by federal courts issuing temporary or per-
120. See Yang, supra note 119.
121. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
122. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
123. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
124. See Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15.
125. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071 (S.D. Ohio
1995), aft'd, 130 E3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No.
97-934).
126. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 211.
127. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-310.5, 76-7-314, 76-7-315 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
128. See Micr COMI. LAws ANN. §§ 333.17016, 333.17516 (West Supp. 1997).
129. See Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1320 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Michigan, of course, is
also in the Sixth Circuit. However, it would be dangerous to extrapolate from the federal appellate
court's divided Voinovich decision to its possible evaluation of the Michigan law. That act tracks the
federal wording, see supra note 39 and accompanying text (identifying ten states whose statutes use
the federal definition), and in a footnote, the Sixth Circuit majority observed: "We note that the pro-
posed federal legislation prohibiting the performance of 'partial-birth' abortions appears to come
closer to describing the D & X procedure [quoted definition of H.R. 1122 omitted] .... We express
no opinion on the constitutionality of this definition or the federal legislation." Voinovich, 130 F.3d
at 199 n.9.
130. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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manent restraining orders; two state courts have taken similar action; and
at least one other action is pending.131 Nine states had bills pending in
1997.132 Fourteen other states have considered similar legislation but have
either rejected the proposal outright or allowed the matter to become dor-
mant. 33 That leaves only eight states which appear never to have ad-
dressed the issue.134 Clearly, the question of the constitutionality of these
statutes-whether federal or state-is a matter requiring immediate atten-
tion. Even more important, perhaps, is the issue of whether, even if these
laws can pass constitutional muster, they represent sound social policy.
IV. THE CONSTITunONAL QUESTION
The House and Senate hearings on the original "Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 1995' 135 included conflicting statements of opinion from
131. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. David Garrow noted recently that "[in [only]
six states [with enacted legislation]-Indiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee
and Utah-no doctors or clinics have yet contested the laws." Garrow, Abortion Foes are Losing,
supra note 38.
132. See H.B. 5566, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997); H.B. 211, 139th Gen. Ass., Reg.
Sess. (Del. 1997); H.B. 1227, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); H.B. 2889, 181st Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 1997); S.B. 875, 181st Gen. Ct, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997); S.B. 275, 89th Gen. Ass., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997); H.B. 303, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1997); S.B. 1132, 69th Leg., Reg..
Sess. (Or. 1997); H.B. 470, 1997-98 Leg., 64th Biennial Sess. (VL 1997); A.B. 220, 93rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 1997). [Legislative information current as of early autumn 1997.]
133. See S.B. 102, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (in Senate Committee on Health and
Human Services; reconsideration granted); H.B. 1136, 61st Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997)
(regular session adjourned; no carryover); H.B. 1460, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997) (regular ses-
sion adjourned; carryover to 1998 regular session); H.B. 2509, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997)
(regular session over, no carryover); S.B. 234, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997) (regular session ad-
journed; carryover'to 1998 regular session); H.P. 390, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1997) (Senate
adopted Committee report; ought not to pass); H.B. 426, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (regu-
lar session adjourned; no carryover), S.B. 493, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (regular session
adjourned; no carryover); S.F. 1502, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997) (going to Senate Committee
on Health and Family Security); H.B. 768, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997) (failed to pass
House); HJ.M. 78, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997) (regular session adjourned; no carryover);
A.B. 5463, 220th Leg., Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (going to Assembly Committee on Health);
H.B. 2201, 46th Leg. Sess., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1997) (regular session adjourned; carryover to 1998 reg-
ular session); H.B. 2898, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1997) (regular session adjourned; no carry-
over), S.B. 1149, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1997) (regular session adjourned; no carryover);
H.B. 1031, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997) (regular session adjourned; carryover to 1998 reg-
ular session); H.B. 2773, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1997) (regular session adjourned; House car-
ryover on author's request); S.B. 326, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1997) (regular session ad-
journed; no Senate carryover). [Legislative information current as of early autumn 1997.]
134. Idaho (legislative session over for 1997); Iowa; Kentucky (no 1997 session); Nevada;
North Dakota; Pennsylvania; Texas; and Wyoming (legislative session over). [Legislative information
current as of early autumn 1997.]
135. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995).
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academicians respecting the constitutionality of the proposed law.136 The
House Report concluded that H.R. 1833 was constitutional under
Casey,137 although the appended Dissenting Views disagreed. 138 Even
when he changed his vote at the last minute to support the 1997 mea-
sure, Senator Tom Daschle stated his opinion that the bill would probably
be declared unconstitutional if enacted.1 39 Notably, as mentioned, in Wo-
men's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has upheld the district court's finding
that Ohio's ban was unconstitutional. 40 Similarly, in Evans v. Kelley, a
federal district judge in Michigan issued a permanent injunction against
that state's law, on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague and
overly broad, and imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy; since that time, seven other federal
courts and two state courts have followed suit.1
41
Thus, the issue of constitutionality promises to present serious ques-
tions with respect to any enacted or pending prohibition of D&X,
whether on the federal or state level. The primary objections can be
broadly grouped into two categories: those posing questions of vague-
ness, and those alleging that these measures fail to meet the standards of
Casey for either pre-viability or post-viability abortions.1 42
136. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 98 (prepared statement of David M. Smolin, Prof.
of Law, Ctumberland Law School, Samford Univ.) (stating view that the prohibition "is constitutional
under current Supreme Court precedent"); Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 169 (testimony and
statement of Douglas W. Kmiec, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame) (stating, "in my judgment,
there are no constitutional concerns"). But see id. at 188 (testimony and prepared statement of Louis
Michael Seidman, Prof. of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center) (arguing that the bill was "riddled
with unconstitutional provisions").
137. See H.R. REP. No. 104-267, at 11 (1995).
138. See id. at 23-24.
139. See Seelye, supra note 109.
140. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071 (S.D. Ohio
1995), afd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No.
97-934).
141. See Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1319-20 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also supra note
129 (noting that Michigan is also located in the federal Sixth Circuit); supra note 38 (listing court
actions).
142. With respect to the federal bill, specifically, the question has also been raised as to
whether the subject matter appropriately falls under Congress' commerce power, as the bill itself re-
cites. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 193 (prepared statement of Prof. Louis Michael Seid-
man). Because this article focuses generally on the substance of legislative bans against D&X or in-
tact D&E (state or federal) as they relate to legal precedent concerning a woman's right to decide to
have an abortion, the commerce clause debate is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is
worthwhile at this juncture to note the following aspects of the debate. In his prepared statement to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Prof. Louis Michael Seidman, of the Georgetown Law
Center, cited United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), to conclude that "if Lopez is taken liter-
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A. Vagueness
The major arguments that these laws should be held void on the
grounds of vagueness stem from their definitions of the procedure which
they purport to prohibit. In this respect, H.R. 1122, the "Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 1997," uses the same language as its 1995
predecessor.
(b)(1) As used in this section, the term 'partial birth abortion' means an abor-
tion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a liv-
ing fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery. 43
As previously noted, seventeen of the nineteen states which have enacted
these laws use identical or nearly identical language. 1 Because the only
extensive congressional hearings on the matter pertained to the 1995 bill,
it is this language which is the subject of the vagueness arguments. To
help allay the vagueness problem, the Senate added amendments to the
1997 bill both to tighten up the definition and to inject a scienter require-
ment, which they regarded as necessary for a criminal statute of this
kind.145 The Senate's amendment adds the following clarification to the
ally, this measure seems to run afoul of the new standards the Court has announced." Senate Hear-
ing, supra note 23, at 193 (prepared statement of Prof. Louis Michael Seidman). Professor Seidman
declared that "[h]aving an abortion is no more a commercial activity than possessing a gun.... Just
as Congress can regulate the interstate purchase of guns, but not the intrastate possession, so, it
would seem, it can regulate the interstate purchase of abortions, but not the intrastate procedure it-
self." Id. Prof. Seidman's position was earlier contradicted by Prof. David M. Smolin, Cumberland
Law School, Samford Univ., in his prepared statement to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the House Committee on the Judiciary. Prof. Smolin maintained that "Congress possesses ample au-
thority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to enact the
proposed prohibition." House Hearing, supra note 23, at 101 (prepared statement of David M. Smo-
lin). In his view:
Lopez does not present any reason to question the Attorney General's conclusion that
"[tihe provision of abortion services is commerce" . . . at least where payment is received,
from some source, for the services. Abortion services would generally be classed within the
broader category of medical and health care services, for purposes of commerce clause analy-
sis. Health care constitutes, as the Congress well knows, a large and significant portion of the
national economy, and it would seem absurd to hold that an industry comprising one-seventh
of the national economy could not be regulated under the commerce clause.
Id. at 102. Professor Smolin also noted that "the statute contains the individualized jurisdiction re-
quirement lacking in Lopez." Id On the commerce clause question, this author is more convinced by
the views of Prof. Smolin than those of Prof. Seidman.
143. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (1997); cf H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (1995).
144. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
145. See 143 CONG. RE.C S4671 (daily ed. May 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Santorum):
But the AMA was concerned that, because the definition was not specific enough from their
reading, some zealous prosecutor could come out and accuse the doctor, who has not per-
formed an abortion-does not intend to perform an abortion-but performed a normal deliv-
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above language (which is retained):
(3) As used in this section, the term "vaginally delivers a living fetus before
killing the fetus" means deliberately and intentionally delivers into the vagina a
living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a proce-
dure the physician knows will kill the fetus, and kills the fetus.146
Among the states who have enacted prohibitions against D&X, only Ne-
braska and New Jersey have so far incorporated a similar scienter re-
quirement,147 so that general comments about Congress' 1995 bill remain
pertinent to virtually all state legislation. On the federal level, the ques-
tion then becomes whether the Senate's linguistic change is sufficient to
overcome general objections based on a vagueness argument.
The Ohio law, which was originally stayed by a federal district
judge partly on the ground of vagueness, 148 prohibited abortion by means
of a "dilation and extraction procedure," defined as follows:
"[D]ilation and extraction procedure" means the termination of a human pregnancy
by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the
brain. "Dilation and extraction procedure" does not include either the suction cu-
ery and, because of a complication, that somehow he or she could be covered under this act.
We have tightened up the language with mens rea, to use the legal term. That directs the
mental state-as to what the doctor was doing when he was delivering the baby for the pur-
pose of a live birth and is not doing an abortion.
Second, as was discussed in the AMA letter, the State medical boards, we understand
that if the doctor is going to be charged in doing one of those procedures, there is going to
be medical evidence presented. The doctor and his team are going to present their medical
experts, and the prosecutor will present their medical experts.
It is admissible in court but not determinative.
Il
146. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997).
147. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Nebraska judge who en-
joined application of that state's ban to one physician's practice observed that "[wie do not reach the
merits of Carhart's second argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. We note, however,
that a similar vagueness argument was recently adopted in a persuasive opinion." Carhart v.
Stenberg, 972 F Supp. 507, 509 (D. Neb. 1997) (citing Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D.
Mich. 1997)).
148. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1063-67 (S.D. Ohio
1995), aft'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No.
97-934). Without using the label of "vagueness" per se, two judges on the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the trial judge's evaluation that the Ohio definition "includes both the D & E and D & X proce-
dures," Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200, and concluded, "the Act bans the most commonly used second
trimester procedure and therefore is an unconstitutional burden on a woman's right to choose to have
an abortion." Id. at 201.
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rettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion. 49
Although this definition sounds more precise than does the language of
other state laws or the federal bill, the trial judge in Voinovich concluded
that "it does not provide physicians with fair warning as to what conduct
is permitted, and as to what conduct will expose them to criminal and
civil liability."'I'- Noting that even a defendant's expert witness who par-
ticipated in both trials found the language in the Michigan law (a close
mirror to the federal definition without the scienter requirement)15 1
"much more broad and vague" than Ohio's provision, the judge in Evans
v. Kelley concluded that "the Michigan statute is hopelessly ambiguous
and not susceptible to a reasonable understanding of its meaning. 
'152
The trial judges' determinations in Voinovich, Kelley, and Planned
Parenthood of Southern Arizona, Inc. v. Woods 153 echo the Supreme
Court's discussion of a successful vagueness challenge in another abor-
tion case, Colautti v. Franklin:154
It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and er-
ratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. This appears to be especially
true where the uncertainty induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.155
Because the statute in Colautti failed to accord to the physician broad
discretion in making the determination of viability, the Court found that
the statute "conditions potential criminal liability on confusing and am-
biguous criteria. It therefore presents serious problems of notice, discrim-
149. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
150. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1067; see also Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200 (concluding that the
law encompassed the D&E procedure, as well as D&X).
151. See MIc. Cop. LAws ANN. §§ 333.17016, 333.17516 (West Supp. 1997).
152. Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1320. For a contrary comparative view of the definitions con-
tained in the Ohio and Michigan laws, see Voinovich, 130 E3d at 199 n.9 (majority opinion of Judge
Kennedy, noting that the federal definition [which the Michigan law tracked] "appears to come
closer to defining the D & X procedure" than Ohio's law); see also id. at 214 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Boggs, expressing view that, contrary to majority's declaration, Ohio's definition was not un-
constitutionally vague). But see Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, No. CIV. 97-385-
TUC-RMB, 1997 WL 679921, at *11 (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 1997) (holding invalid a state law almost
identical to Michigan's and stating that "the Court concludes that the language of the Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and must be found to be void for vagueness").
153. 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997).
154. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
155. Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted); see also Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1305 (quoting Colautti);
Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1378-79 (quoting Colautti, Voinovich, and other cases).
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inatory application, and chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional
rights."15
6
Is this kind of ambiguity present in the prohibitions under considera-
tion here, especially given that the requisite clarity may be measured by
the understanding of the particular persons whose conduct is affected' 57 -
in this case, physicians? The answers from the medical community itself
are divided on the issue, although those divisions often seem traceable to
the speakers' respective ideological positions on the issue of abortion it-
self (particularly late term abortion) or on the issue of governmental reg-
ulation of the practice of medicine.
Dr. Pamela Smith, the Director of Medical Education in Obstetrics
and Gynecology at Mt Sinai Hospital in Chicago and also, at the time,
President-Elect of the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, conceded in her testimony before the House Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution'58 that "[t]here is no uniformly accepted medi-
cal terminology for the method that is the subject of this legislation."' 15 9
However she went on to note that, "[t]he term you have chosen, partial-
birth abortion, is straightforward. Your definition is straightforward, and
in my opinion, covers this procedure and no other."' 16°
On the other hand, Dr. Mary Campbell, a board-certified obstetri-
cian/gynecologist and Medical Director of Planned Parenthood of Metro-
politan Washington, told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that her
opposition to the bill was based in large part on its vagueness. 61 Dr.
Campbell stated that "[tihis bill is intolerably vague. It attempts to pro-
156. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394.
157. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffnan Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 501 (1982) (measuring the challenged language by the understanding of "[a] business person of
ordinary intelligence").
158. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 38-44 (testimony and prepared statement of Pamela
Smith, M.D.).
159. It. at 42 (testimony of Pamela Smith, M.D.); see also id. at 44 (prepared statement of
Pamela Smith, M.D.).
160. Id. at 42 (testimony of Pamela Smith, M.D.); see also id. at 44 (prepared statement of
Pamela Smith, M.D.). In her appearances both before the House Subcommittee and the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Dr. Smith also remarked on the similarities between the abortion procedure
at issue and standard obstetrical practice for a breech delivery and demonstrated her point with "a
model of a 19- to 20-week-old infant." Ild. at 39-40 (testimony of Pamela Smith, M.D.); see also
Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 76-78 (testimony of Pamela Smith, M.D.); id. at 80 (prepared
statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.). Note that a fetus of 19 to 20 weeks is still nonviable. See id. at
99 (statement of Dr. Mary Campbell noting that viability is "about 25 weeks"); see also HtuN,
supra note 46, at 255-57 (citing cases and stating that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
viability cannot be fixed at a specific time period in a statute).
161. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 103 (statement of Dr. Mary Campbell).
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hibit a medical procedure without adequately describing the procedure in
terms that doctors understand.... The bill's vagueness will have a chil-
ling effect on the availability of abortion services. Physicians are unwill-
ing to do things that might be illegal."' 162 Even more forcefully, Dr. J.
Courtland Robinson, Associate Professor in the Department of Gynecol-
ogy and Obstetrics at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, with
a joint appointment to the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public
Health, who appeared before both the House and Senate Committees, 63
stated:
This legislation appears to be about something you are referring to as partial-
birth abortion. I now am beginning to learn a little about what you think it means,
but I did not know it until a few days ago. Never in my career have I heard a phy-
sician who provides abortions refer to any technique as a partial-birth abortion.
That, I suspect, is because the name did not exist until someone who wanted to
ban abortions made it up. Medically, we do not do partial-birth abortion. There is
no such thing.1'
Dr. Robinson went on to testify:
For many physicians, this law would amount to a ban on D&E entirely, be-
cause they would not undertake a surgery if they were legally prohibited from
completing it in the best way they saw fit at the time the procedure was being
done. Because the law itself is so vague and bizarre, leaving them to wonder
whether they are open to prosecution or not.
This means that by banning this very rare technique, you end up banning
D&E, essentially recognized as the safest method of performing secondary trimes-
ter abortions. That means that women will probably die. I know. I have seen it
happen.'"
Dr. Robinson also pointed out in his testimony that during any surgical
procedure, the physician may begin anticipating things to go one way,
162. Id; see also infra note 378 and accompanying text (noting Dr. Campbell's third reason
for opposition-that the bill would outlaw "the safest way of ending a third trimester pregnancy").
163. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 63-67 (statement and prepared statement of J.
Courtland Robinson, M.D.); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 103-06 (same). In his testi-
mony before the House Subcommittee, Dr. Robinson identified himself as "here on behalf of the Na-
tional Abortion Federation, the national professional association of abortion providers." House Hear-
ing, supra note 23, at 63 (statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.); see also id. at 65 (prepared
statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
164. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 64 (prepared statement of J. Courtland Robinson,
M.D.); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 104 (statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
165. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 65; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 104-05.
Dr. Robinson's testimony is buttressed by the finding of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Voinovich that the language of the Ohio statute necessarily included D&E within its
purview. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 200 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934).
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but unexpected events may create a "unique demand" requiring a differ-
ent course of action.'6 At that point, "[tielling a physician that it's ille-
gal for him or her to adapt a certain surgical method for the safety of the
patient is absolutely criminal and flies in the face of the standards for the
quality of medical care."1 67 The federal scienter requirement added by
the Senate amendment might help to dispel this particular concern; how-
ever, almost all currently existing state legislation leaves the issue wide
open.'6
, Perhaps the most objective medical viewpoint came from a state-
ment submitted for the record to the Senate Committee by Warren M.
Hem, M.D., Director of the Boulder, Colorado, Abortion Clinic and a
Clinical Professor in the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department at the
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center in Denver.169 Dr. Hem is
the author of Abortion Practice, the principal medical textbook on abor-
tion procedures, and a well-known authority on the subject.170 He special-
izes in difficult, late term abortions. 171 While Dr. Hem does not himself
166. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 65.
167. Id; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 104 (testimony of J. Courtland Robinson,
M.D.); id. at 106 (statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
168. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Judge Rosen, in Evans v. Kelley, was par-
ticularly concerned that the vague wording of the Michigan law necessarily amounted to a ban on
the D&E technique, one of the most frequently used abortion procedures in Michigan and the only
feasible one between 13 and 16 weeks of pregnancy. See Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1317
(E.D. Mich. 1997). In his view, this fact was decisive on the undue burden question. See id. The af-
filiate court in Voinovich reached the same conclusion with respect to Ohio's law. See Voinovich, 130
F.3d at 200.
169. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 242-55 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
170. See id. at 244; see also HIN, supra note 46, at back cover (Lawrence A. Reich, who
wrote in The New England Journal of Medicine, stated of Hem's text that "it is the first comprehen-
sive work offering a clear and concise treatise on one of the most frequently performed procedures
in the United States today.... [T]his book will serve as the yardstick by which all other information
on abortion must be measured."). Reich also noted that the National Abortion Federation and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America called the book "the authoritative medical treatise on
abortion practice" in their amici curiae briefs in Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 662 F.
Supp. 407 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492
U.S. 490 (1989), and Ragsdale v. Turnock, 734 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aftid, 941 F.2d 501
(7th Cir. 1991). Id.; see also Bonavoglia, supra note 33, at 59 (describing Hem as "the author of a
major textbook on abortion, who does late abortions using a combination of techniques"); Diane M.
Gianelli, Outlawing Abortion Method: Veto-Proof Majority in House Votes to Prohibit Late-Term
Procedure, AM. MED. NEws, Nov. 20, 1995, at 3 (describing Hem as "the author of Abortion Prac-
tice, the nation's most widely used textbook on abortion standards and procedures, [who] specializes
in late-term procedures").
171. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 242-55 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.)
(stating that fewer than 500 abortions per year are performed after 26 weeks). Dr. Hem noted that
"[t]he majority of these are now performed by me or one of my medical colleagues." Id. at 249. Dr.
Hem's statement goes on to describe three cases of particular danger to maternal health which he
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perform the dilation and extraction or the intact dilation and evacuation
procedure, 172 he stoutly maintains that "there is no such thing as 'partial
birth abortion,' "173 and goes on to note that, although the contemplated
"specific operation ... is quite rare as a routine matter," nevertheless,
"lt is my understanding that the maneuvers described by the sponsors
of [the bill] are followed by attending physicians throughout the nation
when the safety of the woman having the abortion is at issue." 174
The two legal academicians who appeared before the Senate Com-
mittee, specifically to address issues of constitutionality, also offered con-
flicting views on the vagueness issue.175 Douglas W. Kmiec, Professor of
Law at the University of Notre Dame, dismissed the vagueness question
as a non-issue:
[E]ven though there has been some concern raised here this morning about vague-
ness, under the constitutional due process standards and under the medical testi-
mony that has been given, I think there is little question but that there is fair warn-
ing to doctors and others who would perform this procedure as to exactly what
conduct is being prohibited. 76
In his prepared statement, Professor Kmiec dealt more specifically with
the definitions of vagueness found in Colautti and other cases cited
herein1n to elaborate upon his view that, despite the fact that the lan-
guage of the bill did not use medical terminology, nonetheless it pro-
vided the specific class of persons affected by the legislation with "fair
warning" of the prohibited behavior.
178
Professor Louis Michael Seidman, Professor of Law at the Ge-
orgetown Law Center, on the other hand, expressed his view. that "this
bill makes doctors guess, at the pain of criminal punishment, whether the
handled successfully. See id. at 249-52; see also Painter, supra note 24 (citing Dr. Warren Hem as
one who "routinely performs late abortions").
172. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 245-48 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.); see
also Painter, supra note 24.
173. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 245 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
174. Id. at 245, 247.
175. Compare id. at 169-87 (statement of Douglas W. Kmiec, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Notre
Dame) (supporting the bill), with id. at 188-208 (statement of Louis Michael Seidman, Prof. of Law,
Georgetown Univ. Law Center) (opposing the bill). The only legal academician to appear before the
House Subcommittee did not discuss the issue of vagueness. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at
97-102 (prepared statement of David M. Smolin, Prof. of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford
Univ.) (supporting the bill).
176. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 171 (statement of Prof. Douglas W. Kmiec).
177. See supra notes 154-57 and infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
178. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 184-85 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas W.
Kmiec).
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procedure that they are engaged in is covered or not."1 79 In his prepared
statement, Professor Seidman made a particular point of the potential
chilling effect upon the exercise by women of their constitutional rights,
cited in Colautti'80 as a cause for invalidation of an abortion regulation
pertaining to the behavior of the women's physicians.' 8' He also singled
out for criticism on vagueness grounds other wording of the bill that no
one else had mentioned:
mhe exception that allows abortions to "save the life of the mother" is itself un-
constitutionally vague. The bill fails to recognize that risk to life is inherently
probabilistic. Suppose, for example, that if the abortion is not performed, there is a
10 percent chance that the woman will die. Physicians are forced to guess on the
pain of criminal penalty whether this risk is large enough to come within the statu-
tory exception."8 2
It is true that the 1995 bill referred to by these constitutional schol-
ars differed from the 1997 version in that the former criminalized any so-
called "partial-birth abortion" in absolute terms, and then permitted an
affirmative defense. Under the 1995 bill, the physician could escape
criminal or civil liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he or she had reasonably believed that the procedure was
"necessary to save the life of the mother" and that "no other [form of
abortion] would suffice for that purpose."18 3 The harsh (and constitution-
ally questionable) specific effects of both the burden-shifting provision
and the "reasonable belief" language have been ameliorated at least to
some extent 84 by their omission in the current federal proposal, as well
as by the Senate's addition of a scienter requirement. However, some
state laws retain these affirmative defense or "reasonable belief" provi-
sions, 85 and, in any event, the questions revolving around the basic non-
179. Id at 189 (statement of Prof. Louis Michael Seidman).
180. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 399-95 (1979); see also supra notes 154-56 and ac-
companying text.
181. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 192 (prepared statement of Prof. Louis Michael
Seidman).
182. Id.
183. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 2(e)(1), (2) (1995).
184. It is worth noting that the 1997 bill does not refer to the physician's "best medical judg-
ment." Instead, it provides that the penalty "shall not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is neces-
sary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, illness, or injury."
H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997). Even if the prosecutor (or the civil litigant) has the burden of
proof, one can imagine bevies of medical experts appearing as witnesses on each side of the ques-
tions raised by the language; sending such questions to juries is problematic, and the prospect seems
likely to be chilling to any physician's behavior.
185. Four states have passed laws that contain "reasonable belief" provisions alone or with
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medical "partial-birth abortion" terminology remain troublesome.
In Voinovich, the federal trial judge engaged in an extensive exami-
nation of the vagueness questions raised by Ohio's ban against the "dila-
tion and extraction" abortion procedure. 18 6 After describing in detail vari-
ous medical procedures used to perform abortions at different stages of
pregnancy, Judge Rice found.
The testimony indicates that the D & X procedure may be considered to be a
variant of the D & E technique. Indeed, doctors who use the procedure may not
know which procedure they will perform until they encounter particular surgical
variables and circumstances after they begin the procedure to terminate the
pregnancy....
Based on the testimony of various physicians, this Court further finds that in
both the D & E and D & X procedures, a suction device may be purposely in-
serted into the skull in order to remove the skull contents, to accomplish the goal
of decompressing the fetal head, thereby facilitating its removal from the woman's
body. Because the statutory definition of the prohibited "Dilation and Extraction
Procedure" thereby appears to encompass the purportedly allowable D & E proce-
dure as well, Plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success of show-
ing that this definition is unconstitutionally vague, as it does not provide physicians
with fair warning as to what conduct is permitted, and as to what conduct will ex-
pose them to criminal and civil liabilityY17
Judge Rice's conclusions contain obvious similarities to points made by
various witnesses at the congressional hearings, particularly the state-
affirmative defense provisions. See M&e.t CowP. LAws ANN. § 333.17016 (West Supp. 1997) ("A
physician ... may perform a partial-birth abortion if the physician or other individual reasonably be-
lieves that performing the partial-birth abortion is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury and that no other
medical procedure will accomplish that purpose."); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(C)(1) (West
1997) ("It is an affirmative defense to a charge under division (B) of this section that all other avail-
able abortion procedures would pose a greater risk to the health of the pregnant woman than the risk
posed by the dilation and extraction procedure."); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, 1997 Ark.
Acts 984 ("It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section, which must be proved by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the partial-birth abortion was performed by a physician who
reasonably believed. 1) the partial-birth abortion was necessary to save the life of the woman upon
whom it was performed; and 2) no other form of abortion would suffice for that purpose."); Act ef-
fective July 1, 1997, 1997 Ind. Legis. Serv. 1185 (Michie) ("A person may not knowingly or inten-
tionally perform a partial birth abortion unless a physician reasonably believes that: 1) performing
the partial birth abortion is necessary to save the mother's life; and 2) no other medical procedure is
sufficient to save the mother's life."). Of course, as of this writing, both the Michigan and Ohio stat-
utes have been enjoined as unconstitutional. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d
187, 201 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934); Evans
v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
186. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1063-87 (S.D. Ohio
1995), affd, 130 E.d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No.
97-934).
187. Il at 1066-67 (footnotes omitted).
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ments of Dr. Robinson and Professor Seidman. 8 Affirming Voinovich,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated its agree-
ment with Judge Rice that the Ohio law encompassed the D&E proce-
dure, as well as D&X. 18 9
A review of the salient testimony and of the two federal court cases
on this issue suggests that these bans are invariably unconstitutionally
vague. On the other hand, virtually everyone (medical and non-medical)
who has addressed the question seems to have a clear picture of the pro-
cedure under discussion.19° At the same time, medical experts have testi-
fied, both before Congress and in two trial courts, that the presence of
the contemplated prohibition would leave them uncertain as to where the
line might be drawn between legal and illegal conduct. This fact, they ar-
gue, would necessarily have a chilling effect upon their willingness to
perform abortion procedures that are now deemed completely acceptable
and even routine. The Senate's scienter requirement may help to alleviate
these concerns. However, of the states enacting these prohibitions, only
Nebraska and New Jersey have included such language, 19' and the effects
of these requirements are largely uncertain. Under all these circum-
stances, the criteria for vagueness singled out by the Supreme Court in
Colautti certainly seem to be met: those subjected to these bans lack fair
warning of the line between permissible and impermissible conduct;192 a
similar confusion among prosecutors seems likely to result in " 'arbitrary
and erratic arrests and convictions' ";193 and "the uncertainty induced by
the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights."1
94
188. See supra notes 163-67 and 179-82 and accompanying text; see also Evans, 977 F. Supp.
at 1304-11 (discussing vagueness issue and concluding Michigan statute was void for vagueness);
Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 . Supp. 1369, 1378-79 (D. Ariz. 1997) (same).
189. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200.
190. Even the two appellate judges responsible for afirming Voinovich recognized that a dif-
ference exists between D&E and D&X; they simply thought that Ohio's statutory language failed to
delineate precisely the necessary distinction. See id. at 200. But see id. at 214 (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(expressing view that "the words chosen clearly define a procedure understood by doctors and lay-
men alike").
191. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
192. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 370, 390 (1979) (citing United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
193. Id. (quoting Papacbristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)).
194. Id. at 391 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967)).
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B. Validity of the Bans Under the Roe/Casey Framework
In addition to potential vagueness problems, the statutory prohibi-
tions under consideration raise substantial constitutional questions under
the abortion rights standards established by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade'95 and its progeny, as modified in 1992 by Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.196 Objections stem from two
sources: the virtually uniform failure of enacted or proposed legislation
to provide for an exception to the ban against using the D&X procedure
for a post-viability abortion when, in the professional judgment of the at-
tending physician, the woman's health interests are at stake (as opposed
to her life); and arguments that the ban as applied to a pre-viability abor-
tion may impose an "undue burden" on the woman's right, as that stan-
dard was delineated in Casey.
1. Post-Wiability Abortions
In establishing constitutional protection for a woman's right to
choose to have an abortion, Roe was very clear with respect to the valid-
ity of regulations of post-viability situations. Roe held that, "[flor the
stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the po-
tentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."' 97 Roe's compan-
ion case, Doe v. Bolton,198 clarified the Court's reference to the "health
of the mother":
Whether, in the words of the Georgia statute, "an abortion is necessary" is a pro-
fessional judgment that the Georgia physician will be called upon to make
routinely.
[.. The medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the at-
tending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is
room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.'9
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
197. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
198. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
199. Id. at 192.
[Vol. 59:301
1998] "PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION" BANS
This definition of "health" has continued to be recognized as the gov-
erning standard and was in no way modified by Casey, where the Joint
Opinion stated explicitly:
... We also reaffirm Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."2°
The federal bill provides an exception to its prohibition, either pre-
viability or post-viability, "to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to
save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,
ilness, or injury.'"20 The bill's failure to provide a health exception was
the primary flaw cited by President Clinton and the basis for his promise
to veto the 1997 legislation.2 2 Of the nineteen state laws that have been
passed so far, only two include an exception where the abortion is neces-
sary to preserve the health of the pregnant woman."3 The trial judge in
Voinovich enjoined Ohio's prohibition partly on the ground that the
health exception provided by the legislature encompassed only the wo-
man's physical health and therefore was not as broad as constitutionally
required by Bolton.2°4 Although the United States Court of Appeals for
200. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (quoting
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65). Although the cited portion of Casey appeared in the plurality opinion, the
statement would, of course, have found agreement in the views of Justices Stevens and Blacknmun.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also, e.g., Bonavoglia, supra note 33, at 62
(recounting the broad definition of health the Supreme Court introduced in Doe v. Bolton and assum-
ing it is still the governing definition); John E. Yang, House Overrides Abortion Bill Veto; Senate
Unlikely to Follow On Highly Charged Issue, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 20, 1996, at Al (stating that propo-
nents of the ban do not want to include a health exception because "health" is interpreted so
broadly by the Supreme Court).
201. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997).
202. See Clinton Vetoes, supra note 119 (reporting Clinton's veto); Yang, supra note 119 (not-
ing latest House vote and Clinton's reaffirmation of his vow to veto the bill); see also Yang, supra
note 200 (stating that Clinton vetoed the ban in April 1996 because it lacked a health exception for
the woman); John E. Yang, House Passes 'Partial-Birth' Abortion Ban; Fight Looms, WASH. Posr.
Mar. 21, 1997, at A12 (stating that Clinton's administration reported that he will veto the bill if it
does not contain an exception to protect the woman's health).
203. See OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2919.15(C)(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("It is an affirmative
defense... that all other available abortion procedures would pose a greater risk to the health of the
pregnant woman than the risk posed by the dilation and extraction procedure."); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-310.5(2)(A) (Supp. 1996) ("After viability... no person may knowingly perform a partial
birth abortion or dilation and extraction procedure, or a saline abortion procedure, unless all other
available abortion procedures would pose a risk to the life or the health of the pregnant woman.").
204. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1080-81 (S.D. Ohio
1995), afTd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No.
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the Sixth Circuit did not need to reach this issue to affirm the trial
court's ruling, the two-judge majority addressed the mental health ques-
tion and, like Judge Rice, concluded that the Ohio ban "unconstitution-
ally limits the performance of post-viability abortions to those cases in
which a pregnant woman's physical health is threatened.
' '2
0
5
Because Casey had no occasion to consider post-viability abortion
regulations, it is impossible to say that the Court would not tolerate more
severe restrictions on abortions performed at this stage than it has previ-
ously countenanced. However, the Joint Opinion's specific reference to
the language of Roe on this point indicates that so far, the law estab-
lished by that case and Bolton remains intact.20 Thus, even if the general
regulation of a particular abortion procedure were to pass constitutional
muster, allowable exceptions would surely have to include both pre-
viability and post-viability abortions undertaken to preserve the woman's
health, as well as her life. These prohibitions are surely constitutionally
flawed, therefore, in their failure to include such provisions.
2. Pre-Viability Abortions: The "Undue Burden" Standard
In 1992, Casey revamped Roe's familiar trimester framework that
had governed abortion jurisprudence for almost twenty years.2° Although
Roe's central holding was left intact,2°8 the plurality opinion found that
97-934); see also Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 208 (discussing the same issue); Planned Parenthood of S.
Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1378 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding Arizona's ban unconstitu-
tional partly on the ground that "it fails to provide an exception from banned procedures where such
a procedure is necessary for a woman's health.").
205. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 207.
206. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
207. See id. at 872 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (summarizing Roe's
trimester framework and noting that, "[m]ost of our cases since Roe have involved the application of
rules derived from the trimester framework"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). Roe held
that a woman's right of privacy was sufficiently broad to encompass a qualified right to have an
abortion. See id. at 154. Because during approximately the first trimester of pregnancy abortion was
actually safer than carrying the fetus to term, the state's legitimate interest in the woman's health
meant that "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at 164. During approximately the second trimester, the
state's compelling interest in maternal health would support regulations reasonably related to that in-
terest. See id. Once the fetus reached viability-i.e., had the "capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb"--the state's interest in the potentiality of.human life became compelling, and it
could proscribe abortion except when necessary to preserve the woman's life or health. Id. at 163-65.
208. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe's essential holding, the holding
we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.
... Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if
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"[t]he trimester framework... does not fulfill Roe's own promise that
the State has an interest in protecting fetal life or potential life." 2°9 The
case therefore held that "[n]ot all burdens on the right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden
standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with
the woman's constitutionally protected liberty. ' 210 To elaborate:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a wo-
man's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends.... In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional bur-
den. Understood another way, we answer the question, left open in previous opin-
ions discussing the undue burden formulation, whether a law designed to further
the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's de-
cision before fetal viability could be constitutional. The answer is no.21
Does a legislative ban against use of the D&X or intact D&E abor-
tion procedure impose an "undue burden" on a pregnant woman's choice
to have an abortion of a nonviable fetus? Examination of this question
logically begins with the only Supreme Court case to consider a state's
prohibition against a specific abortion technique. In 1976, Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth22 invalidated Missouri's stat-
utory prohibition of saline amniocentesis as a method of abortion after
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy 2 13 Based on its findings that roughly
70% of all abortions performed in the country after the first trimester
used the prohibited method, that the alternative techniques of hysterot-
omy and hysterectomy were "significantly more dangerous and critical
the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. And
third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
Id. The first two of these three parts derive from Roe. See supra note 207.
209. Id. (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
210. Id. (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter). Justices Stevens and Black-
maun would have left the holding of Roe unchanged. See id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas would have overruled Roe. See Id. at 944
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Id. at 877 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (citations omitted).
212. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
213. See id. at 79.
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for the woman," that a third, arguably safer, alternative technique was
not yet widely used (and indeed, there was no evidence of the availabil-
ity of this technique in Missouri), and that the maternal mortality rate in
childbirth exceeded the mortality rate of abortions performed by saline
amniocentesis, the Court held that the regulation did not serve the state's
interest in maternal health-the only cognizable interest at this stage of
pregnancy under Roe.
214
There are, of course, notable differences between the bans at issue
here and the situation in Danforth. First, unlike the saline amniocentesis
technique in the 1976 case, D&X is not a widely used abortion method
at this time; in fact, it is apparently quite rare.215 Second, Casey now re-
quires greater attention to the state's interest in nonviable fetal life, so
that the regulation must be upheld unless it imposes an undue burden on
the woman's choice. 216 Nonetheless, the trial judge in Voinovich stayed
Ohio's prohibition partly on the ground that "Plaintiff has demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success of showing that the ban on the D & X
procedure is unconstitutional under Danforth and Casey. ' 217 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit went even further. Finding
that Ohio's statutory prohibition encompassed the D&E procedure as well
as D&X, the appellate court reasoned that the law's effect was to ban the
abortion method most commonly used during the second trimester. 218
Therefore, Danforth provided a perfect parallel and necessarily dictated
that the act be permanently enjoined as an undue burden. The judge in
Evans v. Kelley issued a permanent injunction against Michigan's ban,
partly on the ground that it violated Casey's undue burden standard in a
number of respects. 2 9 Assuming, arguendo, that a legislature could frame
a definition of D&X sufficiently narrow to escape a finding such as that
made by the Sixth Circuit in Voinovich, or to survive any vagueness ob-
214. See id. at 76-79.
215. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
217. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
a.Td, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-
934).
218. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200-01.
219. See Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1315-20 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (analyzing the law
under Casey). Interestingly, Judge Rosen thought that "the reasoning of the Court in Danforth fore-
shadows and substantially tracks the Casey 'undue burden' analysis." Id. at 1315; see also Planned
Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1377-78 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding Ari-
zona's ban posed an undue burden on women seeking abortion); Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp.
507, 523 (D. Neb. 1997) (finding that Nebraska's ban posed an undue burden on the choice of wo-
men consulting one particular physician plaintiff).
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jection whatsoever, were the federal trial judges correct that such a law
would nonetheless impose an undue burden on a women's abortion right?
a. The Casey "Purpose" Prong
As Casey specifically prohibits any abortion regulation which "has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus," 220 the first question is
whether the purpose of the ban is invalid. Casey suggests that its purpose
prong can be met in either of two ways: by "[riegulations which do no
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the par-
ent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of
the unborn... if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exer-
cise of the right to choose"; 221 or "[r]egulations designed to foster the
health of a woman seeking an abortion... if they do not constitute an
undue burden"m (i.e., the same maternal health interest recognized in
Roe and in Danforth).
As Casey revealed, the primary purpose behind Pennsylvania's regu-
lations was to create the kind of "structural mechanism" referred to by
the Court.m The legislature sought to serve the state's interest in prefer-
ring live birth over abortion by taking several steps to ensure that the
woman's choice was a thoughtful, reflective, and informed one: thus, bar-
ring medical emergency, the laws required a twenty-four-hour waiting pe-
riod between the woman's receipt of certain information and the perform-
ance of the abortion; specified that the information must be supplied by a
physician or qualified nonphysician; and provided that the information
must include the health risks to the woman of abortion and of live birth,
the probable gestational age of the fetus, and the availability of materials
published by the state concerning fetal development and information
about abortion alternatives-such as paternal or state-supplied support or
adoption.224 All of these were upheld because they either served maternal
health interests or simply constituted reasonable measures "to ensure an
informed choice." So long as the requirement did not pose a substan-
220. Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (Joint Op. of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter); see also supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
221. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
222. Id at 878 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
223. See id. at 881 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
224. See id. (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
225. Id. at 883 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (referring specifically to
the availability of materials relating the consequences to the fetus). Compare the Court's statement,
quoted above in text, that "the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life
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tial obstacle to the woman's right to exercise her choice, the fact that the
measure was directed towards convincing her to choose live birth over
abortion was not disqualifying.22
The question left unanswered by Casey (because there was no occa-
sion to consider it) is whether a law regulating abortion of a nonviable
fetus may validly serve any other purpose than the state's interests in ma-
ternal health or in influencing the woman's choice towards a preference
for live birth. Certainly, the case is framed in terms of recognizing those
two legitimate purposes, so long as their implementation does not have
the effect of an undue burden. Does a prohibition against D&X serve ei-
ther of these two aims?
There is no evidence to date that the availability or nonavailability
of the D&X procedure as an abortion technique has had or is likely to
have any effect on the number of women who choose to have an abor-
tion 27 The rarity of the procedure tends to bear out this conclusion,m as
does the fact that alternative methods for late term abortions have existed
for many years.2 9 While members of the medical community themselves
differ on the question of the relationship between use of the technique
must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it." Id. at 877 (Joint Op. of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (emphasis added).
226. See id. at 878 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
227. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 235 (letter from Prof. Louis Michael Seid-
man of Georgetown Unii. Law Center to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch in response to questions posed by
Sen. Leahy) ("The net effect of the bill is... likely to be no reduction in the number of abortions,
but only a shift from methods that are less risky to methods that are more risky, to the mother's
health."); 143 CoNG. REc S4715 (daily ed. May 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (After voting
for the ban, Daschle said, "My own decision was not easy, in part, because this bill may have no
practical effect on abortions in this country. It is likely that doctors wishing to perform later-term
abortions will simply choose another option."); 143 CoNG. Rac. S4701 (daily ed. May 20, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Mikulski) ("The bill before us [H.R. 1122] bans one procedure. It does not ban
one single abortion. It bans a method of abortion. It enables a doctor to choose any other abortion
procedure-even ones that might cause a greater health risk to the woman."); Garrow, Editorial,
supra note 24 ("And, even if the law somehow did briefly take effect, it wouldn't prohibit a single
abortion; doctors would simply have to employ different procedures, albeit ones that are potentially
more dangerous to pregnant women. Santorum's hollow endeavor, no matter how successful it has
been as self-promotion, is not intended to reduce the number of abortions."); Page, supra note 111
("Abortion opponents in Congress could have had a major victory, a complete ban on almost all
late-term abortions. Instead, they passed a bill that would ban only one grisly sounding proce-
dure .... Sen. Rick Santorum, R-Pa., who led the fight for the ban, admitted his bill would not stop
any abortions. Doctors have alternatives to the so-called 'partial birth' method. So why ban it?
Politics.").
228. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (discussing frequency of use of the
procedure).
229. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (concerning the techniques of instillation
and hysterotomy).
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and maternal health-with some expressing doubt about the performance
of such a procedure outside a hospital, while others hail it as preservative
of both maternal health and future fertility----a primary actual purpose
underlying these legislative bans appears to be the prevention of unneces-
sary cruelty to the fetus.P'
In Voinovich, where the Ohio ban's stated purpose was the preven-
tion of unnecessary cruelty to the fetus,232 the trial court considered
plaintiff's argument that Casey had delineated the only two permissible
purposes for regulating pre-viability abortions, and that any other interest
was "neither proper nor legitimate."2 33 Defendant, on the other hand, ar-
gued that the named interest in cruelty prevention was "justified by the
'State's profound interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.' ,,234 Ob-
serving that the issue appeared to be one of first impression before any
court, the judge concluded that Casey nowhere characterized its two
stated purposes in regulating pre-viability abortions as exclusive, and fur-
ther, that the state interest in potential fetal life recognized by Casey
could vindicate "interests other than those of persuading the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion, or of protecting her health and safety."3 5
Specifically, the court agreed with defendants "that it would be contrary
to all logic and common sense, to hold that a state has no interest in
preventing unnecessary cruelty to fetuses. ' ' 236 Judge Rice was therefore
willing-as a matter of public interest-to examine evidence on the
question of whether the D&X procedure causes pain to the fetus, even
though he considered other factors to be dispositive of the case.237 Be-
cause of the potential importance of the fetal pain question to the general
issue of whether bans against D&X are either justifiable or wise, it is ap-
propriate to consider the pain question more specifically.
230. See infra notes 357-80 and accompanying text.
231. See HR. Rm. No. 104-267, at 2-3 (1995) (explaining the "Background and Need for the
Legislation" with respect to the "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995") ("The physician, tradi-
tionally trained to do everything in his power to assist and protect both mother and child during the
birth process, deliberately kills the child in the birth canal. H.R. 1833 would end this cruel prac-
tice.... This method is particularly brutal and inhuman."); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voi-
novich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071 (S.D. Ohio, 1995) (quoting the Ohio General Assembly), aff'd, 130
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934); see also
infra notes 238-88 and accompanying text (discussing potential pain to the fetus).
232. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1071.
233. Id. at 1072. Although referring to the ban's stated purpose in a footnote, the appellate
court did not consider this question. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 98 n.6.
234. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1072 (quoting Casey).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id
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The Issue of Fetal Pain
As is true of virtually every aspect of the D&X issue, the perspec-
tives available on the question of whether the procedure is painful to the
fetus seem to reflect the political biases of the respective speakers more
than they do any scientific data on the matter.P1 Thus, the 1995 House
Report advocating adoption of that year's bill stated that "[i]t is well
documented that a baby is highly sensitive to pain stimuli during this pe-
riod and even earlier." 29 Yet not all those who testified before the House
Subcommittee were in agreement with this statement or supplied clear-
cut evidence to back it up.
Two witnesses opposed to the use of D&X offered their views that
fetal pain was an inevitable concomitant. Mary Ellen Morton, R.N., a
neonatal specialist, told the Subcommittee that she was there "to dispel
the notion that unborn babies would not feel agonizing pain" during a
D&X procedure. 240 Her evidence was based on her experience with ex-
tremely premature neonates-some born as early as twenty-three or
twenty-four weeks' gestation-and consisted of the fact that anesthesia
would be administered to one of these babies during any surgery, fol-
lowed by analgesic and amnesiac drugs afterwards, in order to relieve
pain.241 She also related her observations of the reactions of very young
babies to noxious stimuli (such as punctures and injections), noting their
changing facial expressions and their differing vocalizations. 2 42
Robert J. White, M.D., Professor of Surgery at Case Western Re-
serve University, testified that "[bly the 20th week of gestation and be-
yond, the fetus has in place the neurocircuitry to appreciate pain.... As
a matter of fact, there are studies that demonstrate even at 8 weeks
through 13 weeks, there's enough neurocircuitry present so that pain and
noxious stimuli could be perceived." 243 However, under questioning by
Representative Barney Frank, Dr. White conceded that he was opposed to
all abortion.244 Furthermore, when Dr. White testified as an expert wit-
238. See, e.g., supra notes 158-74 and accompanying text (noting that physicians' views on
the vagueness issue often seem traceable to their respective opinions about abortion).
239. HR. REP. No. 104-267, at 4 (1995); see also id. at 4 n.5 (citing published sources sup-
porting the statement).
240. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 76 (statement of Mary Ellen Morton, R.N., Neonatal
Specialist and Flight Nurse).
241. See id. at 76-77.
242. See id.
243. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 67 (statement of Robert . White, M.D., Prof. of Sur-
gery, Case Western Reserve Univ.).
244. See id. at 90 (statement of Robert J. White, M.D.). Dr. White stated in his testimony that
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ness at the Voinovich trial, the judge made a point of the fact that, under
questioning with regard to whether a fetus at twenty-four weeks can con-
sciously experience pain, Dr. White "noted that the problem is 'what we
consider consciousness,' " and admitted "that he did not know 'at what
particular stage in the gestational [age] . . . that an infant is
conscious.' "245
On the other hand, Dr. J. Courtland Robinson, of the Department of
Gynecology and Obstetrics at Johns Hopkins University, who opposed
the ban against D&X on behalf of the National Abortion Federation, of-
fered a view that cast doubt on the value of Nurse Morton's and Dr.
White's evidence. While Dr. Robinson conceded that he was "not a
neuroscientist," he also characterized Nurse Morton's views as
"[i]nstinctively . . . learned," and observed that "[i]nstincts, of course,
are not the way we learn." 24 While hedging in response to a direct ques-
tion by stating, "I'm not sure I know what pain is, ''247 Dr. Robinson
went on to say:
I am sure that if you had the fetus outside and had it sophisticated, you would see
EKG changes, you would see certain reactions. But this [sic] simply the passage of
information from a no-susceptive sensor up to the brain. Whether that is pain or
not pain, I do not know the answer to that.
24
Dr. Robinson's credibility was not itself free from doubt. His earlier
testimony had suggested that fetal pain is a moot question, not for rea-
sons related to immature neurological development, but rather for reasons
pertaining to the timing and agency of fetal death.2 49 In his formal state-
ment, Dr. Robinson told the Subcommittee that fetal demise occurs early
in any abortion procedure, "either by an artificial medical means or
through the combination of steps taken as the procedure is begun. Thus,
in no case is pain induced to the fetus." He also stated that even if
neurological development would permit pain to the fetus (which he
doubted), "analgesia and anesthesia given to the woman neutralizes any
he goes "back to a time in American medicine when abortion was abhorred by the medical profes-
sion." Id. at 67 (statement of Robert L White, M.D.).
245. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1073 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (al-
terations in original), aft'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar.
23, 1998) (No. 97-934).
246. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 94 (testimony of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 64 (statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
250. Id.
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pain that may be perceived by the fetus."5 1
Dr. Robinson's statement apparently echoed a letter to the House
Subcommittee from Dr. James McMahon, who, prior to his death, per-
formed abortions using the method of intact D&E in California.252 Al-
though Dr. McMahon's letter itself does not appear in the record, it is
quoted as stating that anesthesia given to the woman would induce a
" 'medical coma' " in the fetus which, in Dr. McMahon's view, evi-
dently amounted to " 'neurological fetal demise.' ',253 This notion was
vehemently contradicted in another letter to the Subcommittee from Wat-
son A. Bowes, Jr., M.D., Professor at the University of North Carolina.35
Cited as "an internationally recognized authority on maternal and fetal
medicine,"5 5 Dr. Bowes maintained in his letter that "[h]aving cared for
pregnant women who for one reason or another required surgical proce-
dures in the second trimester, I know that they were often heavily se-
dated or anesthetized for the procedures, and the fetuses did not die."6
With regard to the specific pain issue, Dr. Bowes' letter states:
Although it is true that analgesic medications given to the mother will reach in the
fetus and presumably provide some degree of pain relief, the extent to which this
renders this procedure pain free would be very difficult to document. I have per-
formed in-utero procedures on fetuses in the second trimester, and in these situa-
tions the response of the fetuses to painful stimuli, such as needle sticks, suggest
that they are capable of experiencing pain. Further evidence that the fetus is capa-
ble of feeling fetal pain is the response of extremely preterm infants to painful
stimuli."
The controversy over fetal pain that arose during the House Sub-
committee hearings recurred in the Senate Committee hearings five
months later. A registered nurse, Brenda Pratt Shafer, who characterized
herself as "at that time very pro-choice," described her experiences
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (describing Dr. McMahon's work).
253. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 105 (Letter from Watson A. Bowes, Jr., M.D., Prof.,
Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to Chairman Canady) (July 11, 1995)) (quoting from "a doc-
ument entitled 'Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution,' June 23, 1995," by
Dr. James McMahon). It should be noted that Dr. McMahon died of cancer on Oct. 28, 1995. See
142 CONG. Rac. H2921 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996). His death occurred between the House Hearing
and the Senate Hearing; presumably, his failure to attend the former was attributable to failing
health.
254. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 104-07.
255. Id. at 107 (parenthetical injected in the Appendix, apparently by the House Subcommit-
tee, next to Dr. Bowes' signature).
256. Id at 105.
257. IcL at 106.
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working with Dr. Haskell for three days.258 She related her horror at what
she saw, and described movements of the visible fetus prior to comple-
tion of the D&X procedure that in her mind suggested reactions of suf-
fering.219 Her testimony was directly contradicted by a letter read to the
Committee by Senator Kennedy from Christie Gallivan, Dr. Haskell's
head nurse, who claimed to have supervised Nurse Shafer at the clinic.
Nurse Gallivan's letter maintained that "at no point during a dilation and
extraction or intact D&E is there any fetal movement or response that
would indicate awareness of pain and struggle. Ms. Pratt absolutely can-
not have witnessed fetal movements as she described."
°
Also at the Senate hearings, Dr. J. Courtland Robinson repeated the
testimony he had given to the House Subcommittee, 261 including his
statements about the "neutralizing effect" on any pain to the fetus in-
duced by the anesthesia given to the woman.262 On this point, Senator
Orrin Hatch had already read to the Committee the refutation contained
in a letter to him from Dr. Watson Bowes of the University of North
Carolina Medical School263 -the same letter that Dr. Bowes had sent to
the House Subcommittee.264 Dr. Bowes' views received substantial sup-
port from the testimony of Dr. Norig Ellison, Professor of Anesthesia and
Vice Chair of the Department at the University of Pennsylvania School
of Medicine, Clinical Director of the Anesthesia Department at the Uni-
versity hospital, and President of the American Society of Anesthesiolo-
gists (the organization which he was representing at the hearing).265 Re-
ferring to Dr. McMahon's purported statements about the effects on the
fetus of anesthesia given to the pregnant woman, Dr. Ellison told the
Committee:
According to his written testimony... Dr. McMahon stated that anesthesia
given the mother as part of the procedure eliminates any pain to the fetus, and that
- a medical coma is inducted [sic] in the fetus, causing a "neurological fetal de-
mise," or-in lay terms-brain death.
258. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 17-18 (statement of Brenda Pratt Shafer).
259. See id.
260. Id. at 19 (Sen. Kennedy, reading letter from Christie Gallivan dated July 17, 1995); see
also id. at 336 (a copy of Ms. Gallivan's letter appended to the hearings).
261. See id. at 103 (statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.); id. at 105 (prepared statement
of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
262. Id. at 104, 106; see also supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
263. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 52-53 (Letter from Prof. Watson A. Bowes, Jr.,
M.D. to Sen. Orrin Hatch (Nov. 9, 1995)).
264. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
265. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 107-08 (statement of Dr. Norig Ellison).
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I believe this statement to be entirely inaccurate. I am deeply concerned,
moreover, that the widespread publicity given to Dr. McMahon's testimony may
cause pregnant women to delay necessary and perhaps even life-saving medical
procedures, totally unrelated to the birthing process, due to misinformation regard-
ing the effect of anesthetics on the fetus.
Although it is certainly true that some general anesthetic medications given to
the mother will reach the fetus and perhaps provide some pain relief, it is equally
true that pregnant woman [sic] are routinely heavily sedated during the second or
third trimester for the performance of a variety of necessary surgical procedures
with absolutely no adverse effect on the fetus, let alone brain death. In my medical
judgment, it would be necessary in order to achieve McMahon's neurological de-
mise of the fetus in a partial-birth abortion, to anesthetize the mother to such a de-
gree as to place her own health in serious jeopardy.26
Dr. Ellison offered no views on fetal neurological development and made
it clear that the American Society of Anesthesiologists had taken no posi-
tion on the appropriateness of any abortion procedure; its sole desire was
to contradict any statements indicating that anesthesia administered to a
pregnant woman might kill or harm her fetus367
Perhaps the most reliable evidence on the fetal pain issue from the
standpoint of neurological development came from Warren M. Hem,
M.D., the author of the standard medical text on abortion and a highly
respected physician who does not use either the D&X or intact D&E pro-
cedure. 68 In a written statement dated November 17, 1995, appended to
the Senate hearings as a Submission to the Record, Dr. Hem cited an-
other authority as follows:
According to biologist Clifford Grobstein and others, fetal neurological devel-
opment well into the early part of the third trimester is insufficient for the fetus to
experience what we regard as "pain." In Professor Grobstein's book, Science and
the Unborn (1988, Basic Books, New York), ".... an adequate neural substrate for
experienced pain does not exist until about the seventh month of pregnancy (thirty
weeks), well into the period when prematurely born fetuses are viable with inten-
sive life support." Like any other mammalian organism, fetuses have enough neu-
rological development to permit certain reflexes, but this is not the same as pain.
Interpretation of these reflexes as "pain" is highly misleading.2
Voinovich considered the testimony of two expert witnesses called
266. ld. at 107 (statement of Norig Ellison, M.D.); see also &L at 108 (prepared statement of
Norig Ellison, M.D.); see also supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (concerning Dr. McMa-
hon's statements).
267. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 108-09 (statement and prepared statement of Dr.
Norig Ellison).
268. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
269. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 248-49 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
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by the defendant on the issue of fetal pain. 270 The perspective of Dr.
Robert White, who appeared before the House Subcommittee, has already
been referred to. At this point, suffice it to recall that Dr. White is op-
posed to abortion in general; that he testified both before the House Sub-
committee and in the Voinovich trial that by the time of the abortion pro-
cedure, the neurocircuitry to experience pain was already in place; and
that, nonetheless, at the trial he was able to answer a direct question as
to whether the fetus "consciously experiences pain" only by noting the
problem of "what we consider consciousness" and admitting that he did
not know at what point in gestation the fetus could be characterized as
"9conscious.'" 271
The other expert witness on fetal pain at the Voinovich trial was Dr.
Joseph Conomy, a professor of clinical neurology at Case Western Re-
serve University. Dr. Conomy testified that "at the age of twenty to
twenty-four weeks, many of the neural pathways which transmit pain to
the brain are established, although the corticol projections from the lower
level of the brain, the thalamus, are not yet established." 272 It was there-
fore his opinion that "pain can be transmitted to at least the lower levels
of the brain at that age."' 73 Dr. Conomy also attested to the fact that fe-
tuses at that stage respond to both nurturing and noxious stimuli in dif-
ferent ways 74 However, although this neurologist was willing to state
270. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1072-75 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (considering testimony of Dr. Robert White and Dr. Joseph Conomy), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934).
271. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text At the trial, Dr. White first testified that
in his opinion, "the fetus may feel pain during the D & X procedure"--an answer stricken from the
record "because it did not indicate an opinion within reasonable medical probability. Later... after
viewing a videotape of the procedure being performed on a dead fetus, Dr. White amended his opin-
ion to state that the fetus can feel pain." Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1073 (citations omitted). Dr.
White based his opinion in part on the fact that at the relevant stage of fetal development, chemicals
in the brain that suppress pain are not yet established in fetuses, even though the chemicals to expe-
rience pain are. See id.; cf House Hearing, supra note 23, at 67 (statement of Robert J. White,
M.D.).
272. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1072.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 1073; cf., e.g., supra notes 248, 257 and accompanying text; see also House
Hearing, supra note 23, at 77 (statement of Mary Ellen Morton, R.N.):
Well, this just kind of sums it up for you. But basically, we see differences in their vocaliza-
tions. There's different kinds of cries. Even your small babies can actually moan, just like an
adult would. The facial expressions. We see chin quivering, eye squeezing, we see eye roll-
ing, all kinds of brow bulge, a square chin when they are experiencing pain activity. We see
differences in their sleep-wake cycles. We see a lack of consolability. Their sucking ability
changes when they are in pain. Their general appearance, their color actually deteriorates be-
cause they deoxygenate their blood when they are in severe pain. We also see posture motor
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that the D&X procedure would "prompt an unpleasurable stimulus to the
fetus," he nonetheless said that it would be " 'speculative' to try to 'get
inside the mind of a fetus, if there is one.' "275 In the end, in the words
of the Voinovich district court opinion, "Dr. Conomy specifically refused
to testify that a fetus can feel pain"; his reluctance was based on the fact
that the reflex responses exhibited do not tell us anything about the fe-
tus's actual perception.
276
Of extreme interest to this important issue is the last bit of Dr. Co-
nomy's testimony summarized by Judge Rice: "Finally, Dr. Conomy tes-
tified that a fetus who is aborted by the D & E procedure, which in-
volves dismemberment, might experience as much discomfort as a fetus
who is aborted by the D & X procedure." 277 In summarizing Dr. White's
testimony, the court noted that Dr. White agreed with Dr. Conomy that
"the D & E procedure would also be painful for the fetus, although the
nervous system is more formed at twenty to twenty-four weeks when the
D & E procedure is used on a less frequent basis. ' 278 The trial judge
himself, in a footnote to his opinion, stated his own view that if the fetus
does feel pain, the D&E procedure--dismemberment-might well be
more painful than D&X because of the relative speed of each as a surgi-
cal procedure (D&X involving a "relatively quick incision and suctioning
process"). 279 This would be true, in the judge's view, unless the nervous
system was sufficiently less developed at the stages where D&E is per-
formed than at those where D&X is performed.28 0 One problem, of
course, is that at some point, these stages merge, as borne out, inter alia,
by testimony before the congressional hearings that a physician might be-
gin expecting to perform one procedure, and end up having to proceed
with another.281
responses, such as jitteriness and arching, when they are exhibiting a pain stimulus.
Id. Similarly, Dr. White stated.
If one examines the biochemical data, i.e., the concentrations of corticol and
betaendorphin in fetal plasma immediately following the introduction of a needle which
passes through the fetal abdomen (between the 20 [sic] and 34 [sic] week of gestation), one
documents marked increases in the values of these substances strongly suggesting a painful
experience. The classical cardiovascular responses associated with stress and pain can be eas-
ily elicited in fetuses of this age.
Id. at 69-70 (statement of Robert J. White, M.D.).
275. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1073.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id
279. See id at 1074 n.29.
280. See id.
281. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text (concerning vagueness issues occasioned
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Yet, D&E--dilation and evacuation-is the abortion technique rou-
tinely used for fetuses of thirteen to nineteen weeks' gestation, and never
questioned by anyone, except as someone might object to abortion in
general!
2s2
In Voinovich, Judge Rice concluded that the evidence available on
the fetal pain issue is insufficient to justify regulation of any given abor-
tion procedure on those grounds:
Until medical science advances to a point at which the determination of when a fe-
tus becomes "conscious" can be made within a reasonable degree of certainty,
neither doctors nor judges nor legislators can definitively state when an abortion
procedure becomes "cruel," in the sense of when the fetus becomes aware of pain.
That judgment must be made by each individual member of society.
Given that there is no reliable evidence that the D & X procedure is more
cruel than other methods of abortion, this Court is unable to conclude that the ban
on the use of the D & X procedure serves the stated interest of preventing unnec-
essary cruelty to the fetus. As in Danforth, the ban on the D & X procedure there-
fore "comes into focus, instead, as an unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed
to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting," second-trimester abortions prior to
viability.20
An evaluation of scientific data is far beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. However, an examination of the evidence available to Congress after
the 1995 hearings and to the court in Voinovich suggests that surely
Judge Rice's conclusions on this point are correct. The language of
Casey may well be broad enough to include state interests beyond the
two legitimate purposes identified in the case-maternal health and en-
suring a thoughtful and informed choice on the woman's part.2 4 The
Joint Opinion does, after all, talk in terms of "a substantial state interest
in potential life throughout pregnancy." 2s5 While its references to this in-
terest are invariably linked to the two identified purposes-particularly
influencing the woman's choice in favor of live birth by providing her
with information designed to achieve that purpose, so long as the effect
in part by the uncertainties that can surround the surgical procedure).
282. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. Recall that Dr. White testified before the
House Subcommittee that there was evidence that the neurological circuitry for sensations of pain
was in place in fetuses as young as 8-13 weeks' gestation. See supra notes 243-45 and accompany-
ing text.
283. Voinovich, 911 E Supp. at 1074-75 (footnote omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976)).
284. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (identifying the purposes specifically rec-
ognized by the Joint Opinion in Casey).
285. Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (Joint Op. of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF PrITSBURGH LAW REVIEW
is not one of posing a substantial obstacle to her decision making
power 286 -recognition of "the State's profound interest in potential
life"'2 7 could be read to support other kinds of measures aimed towards
promoting fetal welfare in the abortion decision making context.288 If so,
Judge Rice is certainly correct that the prevention of unnecessary cruelty
to the fetus during the abortion process would constitute a cognizable
state interest, so long as the measures serving that interest did not in any
way jeopardize maternal health or pose a substantial obstacle to the wo-
man's exercise of her right to have an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
Assuming, arguendo, that the purpose of preventing unnecessary
cruelty to a nonviable fetus is a legitimate state interest under Casey, the
means of prohibiting an abortion technique that could be shown to be un-
necessarily painful would appear to be a reasonable way to serve the pur-
pose, if (and only if) the prohibited effect of an undue burden did not fol-
low. However, current evidence suggests that at the present time we
simply cannot establish with any degree of certainty the presence of pain
in the fetus that might occur as the result of any particular abortion pro-
cedure. If such a link could be established with a degree of scientific re-
liability, then surely it would have to be a factor in the evaluation of any
abortion technique, not just D&X. Because the regulation would have to
meet the criteria of Casey's effect prong, as well as its purpose prong, it
is necessary to evaluate potential problems related to that standard.
b. The Casey "Effect" Prong
The Joint Opinion states that "a statute which, while furthering the
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect
of placing. a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot
be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends." 2 9 In
the context of a pre-viability abortion, the most likely "undue burden"-
besides that bearing on the decision making process itself, as already dis-
cussed9-is one which, while "furthering the interest in potential life or
286. See id. at 882-83 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
287. Id. at 878 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
288. Any other context conjures up questions of maternal/fetal conflicts and the potential for
state regulation of a variety of behaviors during pregnancy, such as alcohol ingestion or smoking.
Commentators have long presented arguments against the dangers of allowing that much power to
government in the regulation of the behavior of pregnant women. See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, Prena-
tal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WoMEN's LI.. 9, 31-32
(1987).
289. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
290. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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some other valid state interest," 291 would nonetheless have the effect of
undermining the woman's interest in her own health and welfare.292 For
that matter, the Court has in every case emphasized that in any contem-
plated abortion at any stage of pregnancy-pre-viability or post-
viability-the woman's health interests are paramount to all other consid-
erations.293 Thus, medical necessity where the life or health of the woman
is at stake is the only valid reason for trumping the state's interest in the
potential life of a viable fetus; 294 her well-being is certainly an overriding
factor in the pre-viability context.
In interpreting what it means to consider the woman's health inter-
ests as paramount, the Court has made it clear that whenever more than
one abortion technique is possible or feasible, the woman is entitled to
the use of the method which is most beneficial to her, even though an-
other technique might be both generally safe for her and more beneficial
to the fetus. 295 Thus, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth296 invalidated a prohibition against the use of saline amniocentesis
as an abortion technique after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy partly
because "it forces a woman and her physician to terminate her preg-
nancy by methods more dangerous to her health than the method out-
lawed." 297 Similarly, a portion of Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists298 which was not overruled by Casey299
invalidated a statutory provision relevant to post-viability abortions that,
in the eyes of the Court, "required a 'trade-off' between the woman's
health and fetal survival, and failed to require that maternal health be the
291. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
292. Maternal health interests-along with an interest in the potential life of the fetus-have,
of course, been of primary concern throughout the history of abortion jurisprudence. See supra notes
195-200, 206-11 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of Roe, Casey, and Supreme Court
decision making in general on the abortion question).
293. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).
294. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of post-viability
abortions and the failure of D&X bans to pass constitutional muster on the ground that they fail to
provide an exception to their prohibitions when the woman's health-though not her life-is at
stake).
295. See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
296. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
297. Id at 79; see also supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (discussing Danforth).
298. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
299. Casey overruled Thornburgh's specific holdings invalidating certain "informed consent"
requirements specifying that particular information must be given to the woman; that the physician
must be the person to convey it; and that, inter alia, she must be notified of the availability of state-
supplied printed materials concerning her rights and options. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-65
(invalidating such provisions); c. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87
(1992) (Joint Op. of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (upholding similar provisions).
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physician's paramount consideration .... In Colautti, this Court recog-
nized the undesirability of any 'trade-off' between the woman's health
and additional percentage points of fetal survival. ' ' 3"0 In other words, the
woman's health interests must never be subordinated to the state's inter-
est in the potential life of the fetus. This means that, given a variety of
available techniques for performing the procedure, the woman is entitled
to the method most beneficial to her.30
1
It is true, of course, that alternative procedures are available for
abortions at twenty to twenty-four weeks' gestation, and have been for
some time.3°2 As described by Dr. Warren Hem in his standard medical
textbook, Abortion Practice, these may include D&E or a variation
thereof.3°3 In week twenty, according to the text, D&E is still a possibil-
ity, particularly when accompanied by urea amnioinfusion several hours
prior to the procedure3 °4 By this time, delivery of the fetus is difficult
300. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69 (citations omitted). The statute in Thornburgh required
that a physician performing a post-viability abortion must use "'the abortion technique. . . which
would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted alive unless,' in the physi-
aian's good-faith judgment, that technique 'would present a significantly greater medical risk to the
life or health of the pregnant woman.' " Id. at 768.
301. Compare this reasoning to the following language in Voinovich:
The reasoning in Danforth suggests that a state may act to prohibit a method of abortion,
if there are safe and available alternatives.... The issue ... therefore, is whether... there
are safe and available alternatives to the D & X procedure, which is typically performed dur-
ing the twentieth to twenty-fourth weeks of pregnancy, such that there would be no undue
burden if the procedure were banned.
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1067 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934). The
trial court went on to find that D&X may actually be an improvement over existing methods of late-
term abortionand concluded, therefore, that a ban on the procedure was an undue burden on the wo-
man's abortion right. See id. at 1070; see also infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text. The appel-
late court did not directly address the "trade-off" issue. However, it did note that some abortions be-
tween twenty and twenty-four weeks' gestation would involve viable fetuses, and "[the undue
burden standard applies only to pre-viability abortion regulations." Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 201. With
respect to the issue of the validity of a D&X ban for post-viability abortions, the Court of Appeals
made assumptions that appear to be at some variance with aspects of the district court's reasoning:
"Because a state can proscribe all abortions post-viability, when not required for the life and health
of the mother, we will assume arguendo that a state could restrict the abortion procedures performed
post-viability, as long as abortions were still available to protect the life and health of the mother."
Id. at 202.
302. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
303. HERN, supra note 46, at 154. This book is the standard medical text on abortion. See
supra note 170 and accompanying text.
304. See HEN. supra note 46, at 153-54. Urea amnioinfusion consists of infusion by gravity
or direct injection into the amniotic cavity of a salt solution to stimulate dilation; it will induce labor.
See id at 123. Multiple laminaria, used for dilation, will have been inserted over a two-to-three-day
period, prior to urea amnioinfusion. See id. at 153-54.
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due to size and the increasing cohesiveness of fetal bones.305 However, so
long as the bones are not too hard, dismemberment is still likely to take
place; a part of that procedure will include collapsing the skull, very
much as Dr. Haskell has described in the D&X procedure.3
In weeks twenty-one through twenty-four, "[tihe procedure changes
significantly. ' '307 At this stage, Dr. Hem calls for the induction of actual
labor, although he still recommends instrument use as part of the pro-
cess.m Patients with a history of cesarean sections "are not permitted to
go into hard labor as are other patients. ' ' 309 Rather, once contractions
reach a specified stage, such patients should be taken to the procedure
room for completion of the abortion by a D&E technique. 310 The only al-
ternative, the surgical technique of hysterotomy, "has been almost com-
pletely abandoned because of its associated high morbidity. '31'
Complications cited by Dr. Hem as sometimes associated with D&E
include trapped calvaria (skull); fragmented placenta (causes delay in
emptying the uterus and thus "contributes to the bleeding"); 312 placenta
previa;3 3 hemorrhage; ruptured membranes; cervical laceration; perfora-
tion; and infection. 314 The rulings of Danforth, Colautti, and Thornburgh
suggest that if any abortion technique were developed that were more ef-
fective in avoiding or overcoming these problems, women's right of ac-
cess to that method would receive a higher degree of constitutional pro-
tection than would any state interest in the potential life of the fetus, as a
state may not require a "trade-off"' 31 5 between the health interests of a
pregnant woman and those of her fetus.
305. See id. at 154 (Hem mentions the difficulties of increasing bone hardness, particularly
with respect to weeks 21-24).
306. See iU. Dr. Hem's statement to the Senate Committee stated "[i]t is my understanding
that the maneuvers described by the sponsors of [the 1995 bill] are followed by attending physicians
throughout the nation when the safety of the woman having the abortion is at issue." Senate Hear-
ing, supra note 23, at 247 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.). Describing his own approach
(which includes inducing fetal death on the first or second day), he added, "[i]n the case of a breech
presentation of a dead fetus, the procedure described by sponsors of [the 1995 bill] is routinely fol-
lowed." Id.
307. HalN, supra note 46, at 154.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 146.
310. See d.
311. Id. at 123.
312. Id. at 194-95.
313. Placenta previa is defined as "an abnormal implantation of the placenta at or near the in-
ternal opening of the uterine cervix so that it tends to precede the child at birth usu[ally] causing se-
vere maternal hemorrhage." WEm-='s THmD NEw INmENATiONAL DIcIoNARY 1728 (1976).
314. See HIN, supra note 46, at 195-206.
315. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (citing cases using this language).
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Does D&X or intact D&E as a late abortion technique constitute an
actual improvement over current methods in terms of protection of the
woman's health? Medical opinion is sharply divided on this question.
316
But in Voinovich, the trial court heard evidence on this issue and con-
cluded that in fact such might be the case.317 For example, Dr. George
Goler, the Ohio Section Chief of ACOG, testified to his view that D&X
represents an improvement over D&E "because it causes less trauma to
the maternal tissues (by avoiding the break up of bones, and the possible
laceration caused by their raw edges), less blood loss, and results in an
intact fetus that can be studied for genetic reasons. ' 318 Although an intact
fetus also results from techniques using induced labor, Judge Rice noted
that "the use of various substances to induce labor can cause autolysis,
or the breaking down of tissue, which may make the fetus tissue less
useful for [genetic] studies."3 9 Additionally, D&X requires less time
than techniques which induce labor,320 and may well be characterized as
more available to patients, in that it can be performed on an outpatient
basis and, unlike at least some induction and instillation methods, does
not require hospitalization (thereby entailing less expense and inconve-
nience to the patient).3 21 Judge Rice was not persuaded by defendant's ar-
guments that D&X was "not within the accepted medical standards," be-
cause the procedure was too new and controversial to measure in that
way. 3 He cited the testimony of Dr. Haskell, the developer of the proce-
dure, to the effect that in approximately a thousand D&E procedures that
Dr. Haskell had performed after the twentieth week of pregnancy, two
patients had serious complications.32 But after the same number of D&X
procedures at that stage, Dr. Haskell's patients had no serious
complications 24
316. See infra notes 364-80 and accompanying text.
317. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1051, 1069-70 (S.D. Ohio
1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No.
97-934).
318. Id. at 1069.
319. Id.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 1070.
322. Id. at 1069 n.23.
323. See id. at 1069.
324. See id. The court went on to note that "[alithough this is anecdotal, not statistical, evi-
dence, this Court finds that it is both uncontradicted and plausible." Id.; see also Carhart v.
Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 515-16 (D. Neb. 1997) (citing benefits of the banned procedure, with
particular reference to Voinovich).
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Although the Voinovich court heard counter evidence as well,325 the
district court's opinion in essence maintains that the important factor here
is that the issue of whether D&X might actually represent an improve-
ment over existing methods is an open one. Therefore, this potentially
promising new development should not be stymied by the law prior to
having an opportunity to prove itself one way or the other:.
Because the D & X procedure appears to have the potential of being a safer
procedure than all other available abortion procedures, this Court holds that the
Plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success of showing that the
state is not constitutionally permitted to ban the procedure. If this abortion proce-
dure, which appears to pose less of a risk to maternal health than any other alterna-
tive, were banned, and women were forced to use riskier and more deleterious
abortion procedures, the ban could have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of women seeking pre-viability abortions, which would be an undue
burden and thus unconstitutional under Casey.32
C. Other Voices, Other Views: The Fuzziness of Casey and the Incon-
clusiveness of the Constitutional Question
In attempting to analyze the constitutional issues raised under Casey
by legislative prohibitions against D&X, it is important to take note of
the testimony proffered by three constitutional law professors at the con-
gressional hearings027 Of these, two took the position that the ban was
constitutional and one agreed with the conclusions reached by Judge Rice
in Voinovich and Judge Rosen in Evans v. Kelley. The House Subcom-
mittee on the Judiciary heard only from Professor David M. Smolin, of
Cumberland Law School, Samford University.3 2 Professor Smolin
pointed out that, "as a practical matter, given current preferences for
325. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1069. For example, one expert witness, who had per-
formed D&E procedures but not D&X, testified that "the D & X procedure would have greater com-
plications than the induction methods, because there is an increased possibility of perforating the pa-
tient's uterus when the abortion is performed in the late second trimester." Id.; see also infra notes
366, 371-76 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments against the safety of D&X). Although
noting the district court's finding that "the D & X procedure is potentially safer than other available
abortion procedures," the court of appeals did not specifically address that issue. Women's Med.
Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 197 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S.
Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934).
326. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070.
327. The legal experts' views on the vagueness question have already been discussed. See
supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (Prof. Douglas W. Kmiec dismissing vagueness as a non-
issue; Prof. Seidman's argument that the federal bill was unconstitutionally vague; Prof. Smolin, tes-
tifying before the House Subcommittee, did not discuss the vagueness question).
328. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 97-102 (prepared statement of Prof. David M.
Smolin).
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other methods, the law would probably have some influence in the
choice of method in less than five thousand abortions annually. ' 329 Con-
trasting that statistic with the situation in Danforth, where the prohibited
method was used in "68% to 80% of all post-first-trimester abortions," 330
Professor Smolin also characterized the sections of Dr. Hem's text, Abor-
tion Practice, that have been summarized in this article,331 as describing
"an effective method for these late term abortions. '332 Applying Casey,
Professor Smolin concluded:
Thus, it is clear that a prohibition of partial-birth abortions would leave in place
the currently standard and dominant methods of abortion during the second half of
pregnancy. Thus, the current law cannot be viewed, as was the law in Danforth, as
having the propose [sic] or effect of inhibiting the majority of abortions during a
certain period. The proposed ban on partial-birth abortions is a true regulation, and
not in any way a prohibition of abortion.33
Professor Smolin went on to dissect Casey more particularly, and to
discuss its criteria for pre-viability and then post-viability abortions (not-
ing that the time period of twenty to twenty-four weeks' gestation was
"at the periphery of viability").334 With respect to pre-viability abortions,
Professor Smolin's analysis differed from that of Judge Rice. Whereas
the latter took the position in Voinovich that prohibition of a new, possi-
bly safer, technique would constitute an "undue burden" because it
would force a "trade-off" between maternal health interests and the po-
tential life of the fetus,335 Professor Smolin's reading of Casey provided
for much more legislative leeway:
To gain the burden of the undue burden standard, a physician would have to
demonstrate that there was no medically-viable alternative method of abortion, dur-
ing this short period from twenty weeks to viability at twenty-three to twenty-four
weeks. Yet, even Dr. Haskell's paper documents the alternatives of induction meth-
ods, and of Dr. Hem's technique for softening the fetal tissues prior to D&E
abortion.
3 36
329. Id. at 98 (prepared statement of Prof. David M. Smolin). Although Prof. Smolin's state-
ment was written before it was known that use of the D&X technique, or something very like it, was
more widespread than first thought, these numbers still appear to be realistic. See supra notes 65-76
and accompanying text (discussing how often the D&X procedure is used).
330. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 98 (prepared statement of Prof. David M. Smolin); see
also supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (discussing Danforth).
331. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
332. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 98 (prepared statement of Prof. David M. Smolin).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 99.
335. See supra notes 317-26 and accompanying text.
336. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 99 (prepared statement of Prof. David M. Smolin).
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Post-viability abortions are subject to much greater state control, Profes-
sor Smolin pointed out, and "[tihe proposed ban on partial-birth abor-
tions is merely a regulation of abortion, and therefore is, in its applica-
tion to the abortion of viable fetuses, well within constitutional limits."'337
Reading Casey and the ban together, Professor Smolin concluded that ra-
tional basis review was appropriate at all stages,33 and that the ban
served the legitimate purposes of public morality, preservation of the dis-
parity between the physician's roles in childbirth on the one hand and
abortion on the other, and "protecting respect for human life, and for
constitutional persons, by not permitting a fetus present in the birth canal
to be deliberately assaulted and killed.
'339
Similarly, Professor Douglas W. Kmiec, of Notre Dame University,
told the Senate Judiciary Committee that "there are no constitutional
concerns."' 340 Professor Kmiec described the fetuses undergoing the pro-
cedure as "partially-born child[ren]," 341 and accordingly did not consider
the entire process as coming within the definition of "abortion. ' 342 How-
ever, should it be viewed that way, "the Casey standards are well
met";343 the health exception requirement has been fulfilled because
337. lId Indications are that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would
agree with Prof. Smolin on this point. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187,
201-02 (6th Cir. 1997) (Assuming, for purposes of the severability analysis, that abortion procedures
for post-viability abortions could be regulated. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.), cert. de-
nied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-934).
338. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 99 (prepared statement of Prof. David M. Smolin).
339. Id at 100. A number of the ban's adherents have been heavily influenced by the visual
image of a fetus whose body is visible before completion of the abortion process. See, e.g., House
Hearing, supra note 23, at 1 (opening statement of Chairman Canady) ("This hearing focuses on
partial-birth abortion because while every abortion sadly takes a human life, this method takes that
life as the baby emerges from the mother's womb while the baby is in the birth canal."); id at 4
(letter from Rep. Canady and Rep. Vucanovich to fellow Congresspersons) ("We have included dia-
grams of the procedure on the back of this letter. The diagrams clearly show how unthinkable this
procedure is for those who value the dignity of human life and believe in common decency."); Gi-
anelli, supra note 33, at 3 ("In an attempt to derail an abortion-rights bill ... opponents have
launched a full-scale campaign against late-term abortions. The centerpieces of the effort are newspa-
per advertisements and brochures that graphically illustrate a [dilation and extraction procedure.]").
Professor Smolin also explored the issue of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and
found no difficulty in justifying the federal bill. See House Hearing, supra note 23, at 101-02 (pre-
pared statement of Prof. David M. Smolin). As already mentioned, this article focuses on the sub-
stance of the prohibition itself on both state and federal levels; the Commerce Clause issue is beyond
the scope of this examination. See supra note 142.
340. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 169 (statement of Prof. Douglas W. Kmiec).
341. Id Prof. Kmiec was among those who were quite disturbed by the description of the pro-
cess and saw it as essentially a birth. See supra note 103.
342. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 170 (statement of Prof. Douglas W. Kmiec).
343. lad
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"[t]here are both alternative birth procedures and alternative abortion
procedures that are untouched. '' 344 Professor Kmiec was not convinced
that D&X might constitute a safer procedure for the woman, because it
"is really a manipulated breech birth-one of the most maternally risky
procedures that there is.
''345
Taking a contrary view, Professor Louis Michael Seidman, of the
Georgetown University Law Center,3 6 told the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee that the 1995 bill was "riddled with unconstitutional provisions."' 347
With respect to the purpose and effect questions arising under Casey,
Professor Seidman first found no legitimate purpose served by the bill, as
it "does nothing to discourage abortion, per se" and "does nothing to
protect the rights of fetuses" or "to protect potential life." 34 Not only is
any alternative procedure "every bit as deadly to the fetus," but
"[g]raphic descriptions of it are every bit as disturbing."' 9 Furthermore,
in Professor Seidman's view, the effect of the prohibition is unconstitu-
tional under Casey, because "what is outlawed is safer for the woman,"
so that requiring an alternative is deleterious to her health interests.3s°
The lack of a health exception violates the ruling of Casey even in the
post-viability phase.
What conclusions are possible at this point with respect to the appli-
cation of the standards of Casey to statutory prohibitions against D&X or
intact D&E? An evaluation of this question is difficult partly because the
phraseology of "undue burden" or "substantial obstacle" is not self-
explanatory, and no guidance on defining Casey's criteria has issued
from the Court since the decision was rendered in 1992. Furthermore, it
is both possible and plausible to give either a narrow or a broad interpre-
tation to each Casey prong, and that choice may itself be decisive in ar-
riving at an answer.
Thus, with respect to the "purpose" prong, the question remains un-
resolved as to whether Casey's two identified permissible purposes of in-
fluencing the woman's choice and preserving her health are exclusive or
whether they are merely examples of the most likely legitimate purposes
a government might seek to serve with its abortion policy. If they are in-
deed exclusive categories, a law restricting a particular abortion tech-
344. lId
345. ld.
346. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing Prof. Seidman's testimony).
347. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 188 (statement of Prof. Louis Michael Seidman).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. l&
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nique would appear unlikely to influence the woman's choice whether to
have an abortion at all, and the issue would then come down to a resolu-
tion of the second question, the medical question-how would her health
interests be affected?
If, on the other hand, these purposes are not exclusive, a govern-
mental interest in preventing unnecessary fetal pain might well be legiti-
mate. The answer here, however, once again comes down to a medical
issue-does the fetus in fact experience pain that governmental policy
should be directed at preventing? Assuming, for a moment, that the med-
ical questions could be answered and that the answers to both were posi-
tive-i.e., that the fetus does experience pain during the relevant gesta-
tional stage of the abortion process, and that the D&X procedure is in
some circumstances the most beneficial to the woman's health and future
fertility-what is the appropriate relationship between these two answers?
Is the state required to defer to the woman's health interests every time,
even if the additional advantage to her well-being is marginal and the
pain experienced by the fetus is severe? Casey does not provide the an-
swers to these questions. There may be valid arguments that the two pur-
poses identified in the case are not necessarily exclusive and that the
state has a legitimate interest in requiring respectful and humane treat-
ment of all fetuses, whenever feasible.351 Like all abortion jurisprudence,
Casey does suggest that the woman's health interests should always pre-
vail whenever there is a conflict;352 however, the case is incapable of an-
swering either of the two medical questions about fetal pain and maternal
welfare which in turn give rise to the issue of how to weight those
interests.
With respect to Casey's "effect" prong, one interpretation of "un-
due burden" suggests that a woman choosing abortion must be entitled
in every instance to the technique that she and her physician think is op-
timal for the preservation of her health interests, reading "health"
broadly to include her psychological and emotional well-being, as well as
her physical condition. Another arguably plausible view is that any given
abortion technique can be restricted in the service of a legitimate state in-
terest, so long as safe and effective alternatives exist for the pregnant
woman to exercise her legal choice. In other words-according to this
line of reasoning-given the existence of alternative methods for late
351. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Minnesota v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479, 488 (8th Cir.
1990) (upholding a Minnesota statute regulating disposal of fetal remains and finding it rationally re-
lated to the legitimate state interest of "protecting public sensibilities").
352. See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text.
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term abortion that have existed for some time, the prohibition against
one, rarely-used method (which may still be legally employed if neces-
sary to save the woman's life) should not pose a constitutional problem
so long as the restriction serves a legitimate interest. The fact that the
woman might prefer the prohibited technique because it would take less
time, cost less, or cause her less pain or stress may not be a constitution-
ally sufficient reason to invalidate the restriction.
353
To recap the constitutional issues arising from bans against the D&X
procedure: the failure to provide an exception when medical necessity
would dictate use of the procedure for the sake of a woman's health (not
just her life) is surely unconstitutional. That exception must apply
throughout pregnancy, including post-viability abortions. Abortion juris-
prudence has been consistent on this point.354 This constitutional problem
is obviously susceptible to easy linguistic remedy, although both Con-
gress and state legislatures have so far been unwilling to add the needed
phraseology.
There is a very substantial vagueness problem in the legislative defi-
nitions of the prohibited behavior.355 The scienter requirement added by
the Senate amendment to the federal bill may (or may not) resolve this
problem on the federal level; even if it does, only two states' laws have
injected a similar requirement.356 This problem may be more difficult to
resolve than the health exception requirement. However-particularly
given the fact that everyone referring to the procedure appears to under-
stand the topic under discussion-this defect may be subject to remedy,
with careful re-drafting.
The questions raised by application of both the purpose prong and
the effect prong of Casey are more difficult to answer at this time, given
the lack of specificity inherent in the "undue burden" test and the fact
that the Court has provided no further guidance since the case was de-
cided. Strong arguments-persuasive to many, including this author-
suggest that if D&X does represent an improvement over current meth-
ods of late abortion, and thus the woman's health interests are served by
use of the new technique, the constitutional jurisprudence of the abortion
353. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (Joint Op. of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) ("The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more ex-
pensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.").
354. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 161-94 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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cases requires that physicians be permitted to use D&X as a procedure in
any abortion situation where they find it appropriate.
Yet there remains the nagging concern of fetal pain; if indeed the
problem exists, compassion dictates that we not dismiss it out-of-hand.
This is a question that can only be answered by the medical experts, if at
all-not by the legal system. If fetal pain is real, however, surely any re-
quirements that the law might validly impose in order to alleviate the
problem would necessarily have to apply to all abortion procedures that
might cause fetal pain, not just to one of them. As with all abortion reg-
ulations, there would have to be an exception for situations of medical
necessity where contrary action was needed to preserve the life or health
of the pregnant woman.
Another medical problem remains to which there appears to be no
definitive answer the issue of whether D&X or intact D&E is preferable
to alternatives, at least in some cases, as best serving the woman's inter-
ests in her health and future fertility. Again, only the medical community
can provide the answer to this question-not the legal system.
V. VIEWS OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
A. With Respect to the D&X Procedure
The views of the medical community on the D&X abortion method
encompass the issues of both fetal pain and maternal health. The sharp
disagreement with respect to fetal pain357 may militate, as a matter of
medical practice, in favor of trying to avoid or alleviate the. possibility of
any such problem whenever feasible. Dr. Hem, for example (who did not
think fetal pain was an issue at this stage of pregnancy358 and who also
thought the fetus was usually dead before the commencement of the in-
tact D&E procedure 5 9), nonetheless told the Senate Judiciary Committee:
[An] approach, which I favor and which is followed by some other physicians,
is to induce fetal death on the first or second day of treatment of the cervix. This
requires an injection of a medication into the fetus under (usually) ultrasound gui-
dance. This is the procedure which I and one or two other physicians follow. It is
accompanied by other forms of treatment, but these vary according to the physi-
cian. In the case of a breech presentation of a dead fetus, the procedure described
by sponsors of [the 1995 bill]m is routinely followed? 6'
357. See supra notes 240-88 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
359. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 246 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
360. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (referring to the insertion of a suction de-
vice into the skull and evacuation of its contents).
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Dr. Hem's approach may turn out to be the better norm for defining
the medical standard of care, whatever surgical technique the physician
plans for the actual abortion. However, only the medical community can
decide this.362 So long as the issue of fetal pain is as debatable as is cur-
rently the case, it lacks the factual foundation necessary to serve as a le-
gitimate state interest justifying legal restrictions on the surgical tech-
nique of a physician trying to perform an abortion at twenty to twenty-
four weeks' gestation in a manner that will best preserve the health inter-
ests of the woman (including her future fertility). That would be to re-
quire the "trade-off" between maternal health and potential life so fre-
quently invalidated by the Court. 63
With respect to the second medical question-whether the use of the
D&X or intact D&E procedure (or a variation thereof) actually is at
times the best technique for preserving the woman's health and future
fertility-the claimed medical advantages have already been briefly re-
viewed,364 as has the conflicting evidence presented to the trial court in
Voinovich, along with that factfinder's eventual conclusion that "the D &
X procedure appears to have the potential of being a safer procedure than
all other available abortion procedures. ' '365 It remains the case, however,
that the opinions of the medical professionals who have come forward to
date are just as sharply divided on the maternal health issue as on that of
361. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 247 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
362. See infra notes 397-402 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of the "medical
standard of care" and the fact that its definition, even for legal purposes, must necessarily come
from the medical community). Militating against this possibility, Judge Rosen in Evans v. Kelley
noted the high level of expertise (not possessed by many physicians in the country) required to ad-
minister such an injection. See Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1997). He fur-
ther found-
With the injection comes increased risk of hemorrhage, infection, and even uterine necrosis.
There is also the risk of missing the fetus and hitting instead the mother's bowel or a blood
vessel, thereby increasing the risk of life-threatening infection or internal bleeding. Indeed,
Dr. Johnson [the court's appointed expert witness] opined that where there is no independent
medical reason to attempt to ensure fetal demise by injection, "the risks are not justified
medically."
Id. at 1318. Judge Rosen therefore concluded that "attempting to ensure fetal demise ... would op-
erate as an additional undue burden because it would impose additional medical risks on women
seeking abortions." Id.; see also Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1997) (no-
ting difficulties of the injection procedure and the fact that the woman's medical condition may pre-
clude the use of any injected substance).
363. See supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
365. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 124649 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-
934); see also Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 524-27 (detailing the advantages of the new procedure).
[Vol. 59:301
"PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION" BANS
fetal pain. Once again, their opinions are often difficult to assess, because
they are obviously linked to the respective physicians' views on the
moral questions inherent in any discussion of abortion.
Thus, Pamela Smith, M.D., Director of Medical Education at Mt. Si-
nai Hospital in Chicago, and also President-Elect of the American Asso-
ciation of Pro-life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, did not actually ad-
dress the maternal health question head-on, but told the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution:
I have practiced obstetrics and gynecology for 15 years. I work with many indigent
women. I have never encountered a case in which it would be necessary to deliber-
ately kill the fetus in this manner in order to save the life of the mother. There are
cases in which some acute emergency occurs during the second half of the preg-
nancy that makes it necessary to get the baby out fast-even if the baby is too pre-
mature to survive. This would include, for example, HELLP syndrome, a severe
form of pre-eclampsia that can develop quite suddenly. But no doctor would em-
ploy the partial-birth method of abortion, which-as Dr. Haskell carefully de-
scribes-takes three days!366
Dr. Smith also expressed her personal opinion with respect to D&E (the
dismemberment technique used predominantly from weeks thirteen
through nineteen or twenty):367 "It is cruel and violent, but is quite dis-
tinct in some important respects from the partial-birth method. ' ' 36 She
later added:
Today, partial-birth abortions are being heralded by some as safer alternatives
to D&E. But "advances" in this type of technology do not solve the problem...
they only compound it. In part because of its similarity to obstetrical techniques
that are designed to save a baby's life and not to destroy it, this procedure pro-
duces a moral dilemma that is even more acute than that encountered in dismem-
berment techniques. The baby is literally inches from being declared a legal person
by every state in the union. The urgency and seriousness of these matters therefore
require appropriate legislative action. 9
On the other hand, Dru Elaine Carlson, M.D., Director of Reproduc-
tive Genetics and a perinatologist and geneticist at Cedars-Sinai Medical
366. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 44 (prepared statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.); see
also supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (concerning Dr. Smith's testimony, generally).
367. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
368. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 42 (statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.). According to
her testimony, Dr. Smith was specifically countering a point in a letter from the National Abortion
Federation dated June 12, 1995, maintaining that D&E and the procedure at issue were not surgically
different. See id. Note that her characterization of D&E supports the notion that any restriction en-
acted in the interest of preventing unnecessary fetal pain would have to apply to all late term abor-
tion techniques, not just D&X. See id. at 41-42.
369. Id. at 44.
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Center in Los Angeles, expressed an entirely different view in a letter to
Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, which is appended to the Dissenting
Views that became part of the House Report. Speaking of Dr. James Mc-
Mahon's intact D&E procedure, she stated:
One concept that seems to be lost on the general public is that these pregnancies
can have a significant health risk to the mother. Often fetuses that have physical
abnormalities will have increased amniotic fluid that can cause uterine atony and
severe maternal bleeding at birth. Fetuses that have fluid in their lungs and bodies
can cause mothers to experience the "mirror syndrome," where they themselves
become bloated and dangerously hypertensive. Abnormal fetuses often require op-
erative deliveries, and this puts the mother at increased risk of infection and death.
The usual type of termination of pregnancy is a traumatic stretching of the cervix
that then increases a woman's chance for infertility in the future. The procedure
that is up for "banning" allows very passive dilatation of the cervix and allows
gentle manipulation to preserve the very much desired fertility of these distraught
women. To put it mildly, this is not just a "fetal issue," it is a health care issue
for the mother as well. 370
The Senate Judiciary Committee also heard witnesses of diametri-
cally opposing views on the question of the relationship between mater-
nal health interests and the use of D&X. Dr. Pamela Smith offered basi-
cally the same testimony she had presented to the House Subcommittee
hearing.371 Her opinion was substantiated by that of Nancy Romer, M.D.,
also a board-certified obstetrician/gynecologist, and a fellow of ACOG.37
Dr. Romer practices in Dayton, Ohio, where Dr. Haskell operates an
abortion clinic.373 Dr. Romer testified that "I have never had a patient
who required the partial-birth abortion procedure for maternal illness or
fetal malformations. ' 374 She also stated that "[olur hospital ... [has]
found alternatives that we feel have been proven to be efficacious and
safe. '375 Dr. Romer went on to criticize Dr. Haskell for performing deli-
cate procedures at risky stages of pregnancy in outpatient facilities and
told the Subcommittee, "[w]ithout this legislation, we are protecting a
procedure whose safety and efficacy are highly suspect. ' 376
On the other hand, Dr. Mary Campbell, Medical Director of Planned
Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington and a board-certified obstetri-
370. H.R. REP. No. 104-267, at 31 (1995).
371. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 75-79 (statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.); id. at
79-83 (prepared statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.).
372. See id. at 109 (statement of Nancy Romer).
373. See id.
374. lId
375. Id.
376. Id. at 110.
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cian/gynecologist who had spent time observing at Dr. James McMahon's
clinic, told the Senate Committee that "[b]ecause the fetal head is de-
compressed, only two-thirds of the dilation necessary for spontaneous
vaginal delivery is necessary for intact D&E. This markedly decreases
the chance of cervical lacerations during the procedure and cervical in-
competence in future pregnancies."' 377 She concluded by stating that she
opposed the bill for three medically-based reasons: (1) vagueness; (2) the
consequent chilling effect on a woman's right to have an abortion; and
(3) "[tlhis bill outlaws the safest way of ending a third trimester preg-
nancy... safer than induction, far safer than hysterotomy."378
As was true with the fetal pain issue, perhaps the most objective
and expert testimony in the congressional hearings on the issue of mater-
nal health came from Dr. Warren Hem, who does not use the D&X or
intact D&E procedure himself but who was familiar with the technique,
particularly the work of Dr. James McMahon.379 Dr. Hem told the Senate
Committee:
The possible advantages of Intact D & E procedure include a reduction of the
risk of perforation of the uterus. Since most women seeking abortions are young
women who hope to reproduce in the future, having a safe abortion technique for
late abortion is of paramount importance, aside from the prevention of
complications.
Another advantage of the Intact D & E is that it eliminates the risk of embo-
lism of cerebral tissue into the woman's blood stream. This catastrophe can be al-
most immediately fatal 80
Thus, currently available medical evidence on the issue of maternal
health is inconclusive, yet at least some relevant data suggest the possi-
bility that D&X or intact D&E may actually represent an improvement
over older late term abortion techniques. If that is the case, to prohibit
use of the new procedure would violate the constitutionally protected
prohibition against forcing a "trade-off" between the woman's health in-
terests and the state's interest in potential life. Therefore, like the fetal
pain question, the maternal health debate also fails to provide the factual
foundation necessary for restricting a woman's right of access to this par-
ticular abortion method, if she and her physician should determine that it
377. Id at 101 (statement of Dr. Mary Campbell); see also id. at 102 (prepared statement of
Dr. Mary Campbell). Dr. Campbell defined "cervical incompetence" as referring to "a cervix so
weakened by trauma that it opens too early in [subsequent] pregnancy." ld.
378. Id. at 101, 103; see also supra notes 33, 160-61 and accompanying text (concerning the
testimony of Dr. Mary Campbell).
379. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 245 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
380. Id. at 248 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D.).
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is the best procedure for preserving her physical, emotional, and psycho-
logical health.
B. With Respect to Legislative Intervention
In addition to their professional evaluations of the specific procedure
at issue, many members of the medical community have also spoken out
on the appropriateness of this particular kind of legislative intervention
into the exercise of their professional judgment. While it is easy to dis-
miss their protests on the grounds that no one, after all, likes to be regu-
lated, and furthermore, that the medical profession has long been regu-
lated-often over its registered protest-others have joined them in this
instance, recognizing that this is a different kind of regulation from any
others enacted to date. While other laws have, for example, established
mechanisms for licensing members of the medical profession, for disci-
plinary procedures, for the prevention of fraud on the part of medical
professionals, or to provide guidelines as to how the public fisc shall be
expended for medical care,381 the law has not heretofoie attempted to tell
qualified physicians what surgical procedures they may or may not en-
gage in for the purpose of achieving valid medical objectives (in this
case, abortions that would definitely be legal if carried out in any other
established manner comporting with the medical standard of care-a
standard traditionally defined by the medical profession38 2).
Thus, Dr. J. Courtland Robinson, of the Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine, stated at the congressional hearings:
When a woman is faced with a need to terminate a pregnancy, the physician
has a number of different techniques available in selecting according to the total
medical situation: hypertonic glucose, saline, urea, suction D&C, suction D&E. We
have used different techniques over the years in our practice. As in all of medicine,
we develop and select techniques which are most appropriate, study the long-term
impacts, and determine which is safer. The physician needs to be able to decide, in
consultation with the patient and based upon her specific physical and emotional
needs, what is the appropriate method. The practice of medicine by committee or
legislature is not good for patients or for medicine in general.s
3
381. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
382. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 14 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that "[tihe
Senate should oppose this bill because its enactment would be the first time in American history that
Congress has outlawed a specific medical procedure"); HR. REP. No. 104-267, at 22 (1995) (Dis-
senting Views) ("There is no other example in Federal law of Congress prescribing which of a series
of valid medical procedures a licensed doctor may or may not undertake."); see also supra note 97
and accompanying text.
383. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 103-04 (statement of L Courtland Robinson, M.D.);
see also id. at 105-06 (prepared statement of J. Courtland Robinson, M.D.).
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Similarly, Dr. Warren Hem emphasized the importance of according phy-
sicians the right to make professional judgments based on their expertise,
particularly in on-the-spot situations:
While I may choose a different method of performing a late abortion, I sup-
port the right of my medical colleagues to use whatever methods they deem appro-
priate to protect the woman's safety during this difficult procedure. It is simply not
possible for others to second guess the surgeon's judgment in the operating room.
That would be dangerous and unacceptable. 3 4
Later, after describing three particularly harrowing situations in which he
had to act quickly to perform abortions in order to save the women's
lives,3e Dr. Hem stated even more dramatically: "Mr. Chairman, I did
not have time with any of these cases to consult the United States Senate
on the proper method of performing the abortions. ' 386 In a similar vein,
ACOG reacted to H.R. 1122 with a policy statement that summarizes a
number of the points made in this article:
Terminating a pregnancy is performed in some circumstances to save the life
or preserve the health of the mother. Intact D & X is one of the methods available
in some of these situations. A select panel convened by ACOG could identify no
circumstances under which this procedure... would be the only option to save the
life or preserve the health of the woman. An intact D & X, however, may be the
best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or
preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with the pa-
tient, based upon the woman's particular circumstances can make this decision. The
potential exists that legislation prohibiting specific medical practices, such as intact
D & X, may outlaw techniques that are critical to the lives and health of American
women. The intervention of legislative bodies into medical decision making is in-
appropriate, ill advised, and dangerous.3 7
The medical opinions cited have been buttressed by some of the
policymakers involved in the congressional hearings, although obviously
not by a majority. For example, in the 1995 House Subcommittee hearing
on H.R. 1833 ("The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995"), the Hon.
Sheila Jackson Lee expressed her view that "[tlo criminalize a physician
for concluding a surgical procedure in the way he or she deems to be
safest for the patient-the woman-is tantamount to legislating malprac-
tice. '38 The fourteen representatives who joined in the Dissenting Views
384. Id at 248 (statement of Warren M. Hem, M.D., M.P.H., Ph.D.).
385. See id. at 249-52.
386. Id. at 252.
387. ACOG, Statement on Intact D&X, supra note 8, at 2.
388. House Hearing, supra note 23, at 103 (Appendix 1) (Statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson
Lee).
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to the House Report stated as follows:
The legislation outlaws a valid medical procedure used when other methods of
late term abortion may be more dangerous to the health or life of the woman who
has decided to undergo an abortion. There is no other example in Federal law of
Congress prescribing which of a series of valid medical procedures a licensed doc-
tor may or may not undertake. It is inappropriate for Members to substitute their
judgment for the professional opinion of doctors, and we oppose the effort to do it.
The decision to perform one form of abortion over another is a difficult one, often
made during a complicated, premature labor, which requires expert, professional
judgment of a doctor. This legislation indefensibly interferes with the medical judg-
ment of licensed doctors 89
These policymakers express legitimate concerns that should be weighed
carefully before any legislature, on any level, attempts to address ques-
tions with respect to appropriate medical procedures for specific medical
situations.
Does this mean that medical practitioners should be left free to per-
form potentially dangerous and insufficiently proven procedures on un-
suspecting patients whose lives and health could thereby be negatively
affected? Of course not. Nor does it mean that the legal system has no
part to play in safeguarding patients' interests. Rather, the contention
here is that effective mechanisms for dealing with the appropriateness of
any given non-experimental medical procedure, such as D&X,399 are al-
ready in place, and further, that those mechanisms are sufficient to pro-
tect patients whose physicians might recommend or perform that particu-
lar procedure.
VI. ALTERNATIVES FOR APPROPRIATE REGULATION: SELF-POLICING AND
THE TORT SYSTEM
Despite the many federal and state laws which have some bearing
on the medical profession,39' basic governance of the practice of
medicine, like that of other professions, has been self-governance.3 92
Thus, licensing requirements are established by state law, but implemen-
tation-including both access to entry and disciplinary actions-is left to
389. HR. REP. No. 104-267, at 22 (1995); cf. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 14; see also
supra note 382.
390. No contention has been made in any of the materials examined here that D&X is an ex-
perimental technique and thus should be subjected to any regulations involving experimental
procedures.
391. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
392. See generally I FuRiow Er Ai., supra note 13, § 3-1, at 86 (discussing licensing require-
ments for the health professions). The section also discusses arguments contra this position. See id
[Vol. 59:301
"PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION" BANS
"boards dominated by the regulated professions. ' 393 Credentialing for
staff hospital privileges and disciplinary actions taken with regard to
those already on staff constitute other forms of peer control that physi-
cians exercise over each other.
394
To licensing and credentialing procedures for hospital staff may now
be added review for admission as providers to managed care systems.
395
Again, there is an interplay between law, which provides the framework
for the systems of evaluation, and physician-administered peer review,
which provides the evaluations themselves of whether accepted medical
practice standards have been met. Thus, both federally qualified and state
regulated health maintenance organizations generally "must establish on-
going internal quality assurance programs, including procedures for prob-
lem identification, corrective action, and interpretation and analysis of
patterns of care rendered to individual patients by individual
providers."396
The leading treatise on health law states the traditional justification
for the extensive degree of self-policing among doctors: "Allocation of
substantial power to the medical professions furthers the public interest,
it is argued, because the lay public is incapable of adequately evaluating
the quality of medical services. ' '397 Although some commentators have
taken issue with this hypothesis,398 the general policy of physician self-
policing remains the norm.399
Added to the licensing and peer review systems is the tort system it-
self, provided by the law. A patient whose physician (or other health care
professional) has breached the duty of meeting the medical standard of
care in the provision of health care services is entitled to a civil recov-
ery, when that breach has resulted in compensable damages to the pa-
tient. ° The medical standard of care consists of that degree of care that
a reasonable physician (or other health care professional) would have
393. Id. § 3-1, at 85.
394. See id. § 3-1, at 86.
395. See, e.g., 2 FuRtow Er Ai-, supra note 13, § 11-11, at 53-60 (discussing regulation of
health maintenance organizations).
396. Id. § 11-11, at 56; see also id. § 11-12, at 60 (noting that preferred provider programs
also frequently include quality assurance programs); id. § 8-3 (noting that managed care organiza-
tions are increasingly held liable for the malpractice of their physicians, on the grounds of failure to
select medical staff properly or to provide continuing supervision and control of medical staff).
397. 1 Fuutow Er At., supra note 13, § 3-1, at 86.
398. See id
399. See generally id § 6-2.
400. See id.
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provided under the circumstances. 401 As noted earlier, this standard of
care can only be defined by medical professionals themselves; hence, ex-
pert witnesses are routinely necessary in the trial of a medical malprac-
tice case.A0 When this fact is added to the mechanisms of licensure and
peer review, the clear picture that emerges is that the law, traditionally
and still today, depends upon the medical profession itself to determine
those situations in which a health care provider has overstepped legal
bounds in providing medical care and should suffer appropriate legal
consequences. This is certainly true of actual medical procedures, particu-
larly surgical procedures.
Why should the situation be any different with respect to the abor-
tion procedure known as D&X or intact D&E? Unlike the case with most
instances of medical decision making, the right of a woman to decide to
have an abortion of a nonviable fetus is a constitutionally protected
right.4 3 Her right to have an abortion of even a viable fetus is also con-
stitutionally protected, if the abortion is necessary to preserve her life or
health.404 One would think, then, that legislatures should be especially
chary about stepping in to tell physicians how to perform this particular
kind of medical treatment. At the very least, there should be clear evi-
dence of failure on the part of the usual means of protecting society from
questionable medical practices before any legislature, federal or state,
would attempt to tell physicians how they must (or must not) behave
with respect to the performance of an otherwise legal abortion.
Yet where is this evidence? It appears to be altogether lacking. All
the research that forms the basis for this article failed to yield a single
example of a malpractice suit brought against a physician because of an
adverse patient outcome following performance of an abortion using the
method of D&X or intact D&E. On the contrary, there were many heart-
felt statements of gratitude and relief by women who had undergone the
procedure.4
To those who would counter that it is not the women but the fetuses
whose welfare is primarily harmed by this procedure, the answer must be
that no regulation may require a "trade-off" between the woman's health
interests and the state's interest in potential life. So far, there is no fac-
tual foundation to justify prohibiting any particular abortion procedure
401. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 62, 64, 83-92 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:301
"PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION" BANS
based on the state's interest in preventing unnecessary fetal pain. If that
foundation can ever be established, surely any resulting regulation would
have to address the fetal pain issue as it might arise in relation to any
abortion technilue (including the now routine dismemberment technique
of D&E), not just D&X.A
Others may point out that the normal peer review mechanisms can-
not always be counted on here, because a physician working at an abor-
tion clinic does not necessarily need, and may not have, staff privileges
at any hospital. Such is, in fact, the case with Dr. Martin Haskell, the de-
veloper of D&X.4° Furthermore, a physician whose sole work is in an
abortion clinic may not be a member of any managed care organiza-
tion-although that would not universally be the case. Dr. Haskell testi-
fied at the Voinovich trial that "[r]oughly. twenty five percent of patients
have insurance to cover the procedure. ' " Thus, although Medicare cov-
ers no abortions, and Medicaid does not cover abortions in many states
(including Ohio'), some health insurance plans-and therefore, presum-
ably, some managed care plans-do. 410 One would expect this to be par-
ticularly true of medically necessary or therapeutic abortions, which
would characterize a significant percentage of D&X procedures, includ-
ing those performed on the women who testified at the congressional
hearings and those who stood with President Clinton when he announced
his veto of the 1995 federal bill.
411
It may be, then, that the usual credentialing systems would not ap-
ply to a given physician whose practice was confined to work in an abor-
tion clinic; there may be no one "looking over his or her shoulder," so
to speak. Yet, there remains the licensing system. State medical boards
are empowered not only to license medical professionals and to take dis-
406. For example, Dr. Hem's practice of a lethal injection to the fetus prior to the abortion
might even become part of the medically defined standard of care, if fetal pain should be scientifi-
cally established. See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text. But note also the degree of exper-
tise involved, and the necessity of using ultrasound to guide the physician's injection. See supra
notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
407. See Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 45 (containing portions of the trial transcript intro-
duced into the record by Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee). In ad-
dition to being asked whether he had staff privileges at any hospital (the answer to which was, "No,
[I do] not."), Dr. Haskell was also questioned about his board certification. See iL at 31, 45. He re-
sponded that he was at one time certified in family practice, but did not re-certify. See id. at 32.
408. Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 43 (transcript of the Voinovich trial, cross-examination
of Martin Haskell, M.D.).
409. See hL
410. See id.
411. See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
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ciplinary action against them (including suspension, revocation, proba-
tion, reprimand, or other kind of censure), but also to set standards by
which to evaluate their conduct, in terms of appropriate medical care and
patient safety.412 Certainly, the medical board in Ohio knows what Dr.
Martin Haskell is doing and could take steps to curtail his activities, if
board members thought them medically unacceptable. While other physi-
cians may be more circumspect in publicizing their abortion methods,
any method of self-policing--or, for that matter, any policing of behavior
at all-rests on the notion that those who are not obeying valid rules will
be found out and subjected to appropriate consequences. Yet, the research
upon which this article is based disclosed no instance of disciplinary ac-
tion taken against a physician by a state medical board based upon an
evaluation that the physician's performance of D&X or intact D&E vio-
lated the norms of medically acceptable conduct. Thus, while there is
clearly disagreement among members of the medical profession about
this procedure, there appears to be no consensus among responsible phy-
sicians that the practice should be stopped. Under these circumstances,
legislation that would achieve that effect seems particularly foundation-
less and ill-advised.
VIL CoNcLusIoN
Abortion, particularly late term abortion, is never a pretty process.
In the section of his text, Abortion Practice, dealing with "Second-
Trimester Abortion," Dr. Warren Hem points to D&E as "an emotionally
stressful experience" 413 for those who participate in providing the proce-
dure and makes the following observation:
It is of utmost importance to keep in mind the advantages that the procedure offers
for patients and that the professional responsibilities of genuinely helping other
people with difficult problems are frequently stressful. Those providing D & E pro-
cedures must be keenly aware of their level of commitment to the availability of
choice for women in this stage of pregnancy. A strong commitment is as important
here as is excellence in surgical technique.414
412. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2912.1 (Michie Supp. 1997) (empowering the State
Board of Medicine to "prescribe by regulation such requirements as may be necessary to ensure
continued practitioner competence," and providing further that "[i]n promulgating such regulations,
the Board shall consider (i) the need to promote ethical practice, (ii) an appropriate standard of care,
(iii) patient safety, (iv) application of new medical technology, (v) appropriate communication with
patients, and (vi) knowledge of the changing health care systems"); see also id. § 54.1-2915 (author-
izing disciplinary actions). See generally I FURRow Er AL., supra note 13, § 3-1.
413. HERN, supra note 46, at 134.
414. Id. at 134-35.
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"PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION" BANS
The same is surely true of any abortion procedure at this or a later stage
of pregnancy and must be especially true of D&X. In fact, it is the shock
value of the physical description of the procedure upon which its oppo-
nents often seem to rely in garnering support for their position.415 Yet,
the dismemberment techniques of D&E are certainly just as shocking, at
least to this writer.
In resolving what has become a highly emotional debate over the
D&X procedure (a debate that has rekindled the larger social policy de-
bate over abortion itself), we must not lose sight of the constitutional
protection accorded to women choosing abortion-certainly where the fe-
tus is nonviable, but even, under appropriate conditions, where the stage
of viability has been reached. A review of relevant Supreme Court prece-
dent shows these laws to be unconstitutional in some respects: in their
failure to provide an exception to their terms where the health of the wo-
man (not just her life) may be endangered; and in the vagueness of their
language, especially where no scienter requirement has been included in
the criminal statute. Beyond those two specific points, these legislative
415. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 23, at 116 (prepared statement of Helen M. Alvare,
Esq.) ("Call it natural law, call it human instinct, or call it a basic sense of fairness, the partial-birth
abortion violates everything that is good, everything held dear in the human person and the human
community. When a practitioner uses a sharp scissor to stab a hole in a baby's skull and vacuum out
its brains, and calls it a 'medical procedure,' words have lost their meaning."); House Hearing,
supra note 23, at 4 (letter of Canady and Vucanovih):
This type of abortion, performed in the second and third trimester of pregnancy, is particu-
larly brutal and inhuman because the baby is delivered except for the head before the abor-
tionist kills the baby....
During the partial-birth procedure, the abortionist uses forceps to pull a living baby feet-
first through the birth canal until the baby's body is exposed, leaving only the head just
within the uterus. The abortionist then forces surgical scissors into the base of the baby's
skull creating an incision through which he inserts a suction tube to evacuate the brain tissue
from the baby's skull. The evacuation of this tissue causes the skull to collapse, allowing the
baby's head to be pulled from the birth canal.
Id.; Gianelli, supra note 33, at 3 ("By depicting a procedure expected to make most readers squeam-
ish, campaign sponsors hope to convince voters and elected officials that a proposed federal abor-
tion-rights bill is so extreme that states would have no authority to limit abortions-even on poten-
tially viable fetuses."); Barbara Vobejda & David Brown, Harsh Details Shit Tenor of Abortion
Fight; Both Sides Bend Facts On Late-Term Procedure, WAs. PosT, Sept. 17, 1996, at Al (referring
to Haskell's paper describing the procedure):
It provided what abortion foes had long believed was crucial in turning public opinion
their way: a graphic description of one type of abortion they felt would offend many, perhaps
most, Americans....
The activists believed that publicizing the details of the procedure would fuel a national
debate, pull many abortion rights liberals to their side and prompt Congress for the first time
to ban a specific abortion procedure.
They were right.
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prohibitions are highly constitutionally suspect under both the purpose
and effect prongs of the "undue burden" standard enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Casey.
Even if the constitutional defects could be remedied, strong social
policy considerations militate heavily against legislative intervention into
a medical judgment call about the appropriate surgical technique to use
in performing an otherwise legal abortion. If D&X turns out to be "bad
medicine" in the eyes of the medical profession, the procedures for its
regulation are already in place-peer review mechanisms, state medical
board licensing decisions, and the medical malpractice system. Unless
and until these procedures prove unequal to their task of protecting pa-
tient welfare while ensuring responsible and ethical medical decision
making, it is constitutionally questionable and represents unsound social
policy for Congress to define an "accepted medical procedure." That
standard can come only from the medical community, and in this respect,
abortion is no different from any other medical procedure.
